The Moral Reality of War: Defensive Force and Just War Theory by Underwood III, Maj Robert E.
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
4-22-2009
The Moral Reality of War: Defensive Force and Just
War Theory
Maj Robert E. Underwood III
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Underwood III, Maj Robert E., "The Moral Reality of War: Defensive Force and Just War Theory." Thesis, Georgia State University,
2009.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/53
 
THE MORAL REALITY OF WAR: DEFENSIVE FORCE AND JUST WAR THEORY 
 
by 
 
MAJOR ROBERT E. UNDERWOOD III 
 
 
Under the Direction of Andrew Altman 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The permissible use of defensive force is a central tenet of the traditional legal and 
philosophical justification for war and its practice.  Just War Theory holds a nation’s right to resist 
aggressive attack with defensive force as the clearest example of a just cause for war.  Just War 
Theory also stipulates norms for warfare derived from a conception of defensive force asserted to 
be consistent with the moral reality of war.  Recently, these aspects of Just War Theory have been 
criticized.  David Rodin has challenged the status of national defense as an uncontroversial just 
cause.  Jeff McMahan has charged that Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare are 
inconsistent with the norms of permissive defensive force.  In this thesis I defend the status of 
national defense as a clear case of a just cause.  However, my defense may require revision of Just 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION – The Line of Departure 
War is no mere pastime; it is no mere joy in daring and winning, no place for irresponsible 
enthusiasts.  It is a serious means to a serious end … – Clausewitz, On War 
 
 There are a variety of views to take regarding war.  Realists like Hegel and John Boyd 
take war to be a necessary fact of human existence either because the realization of human 
freedom requires war, or because war is an instrument of Darwinian selection in the biological 
existence of humanity.  Pacifists take war to be an irredeemably immoral practice–one that is 
never justified and always avoidable.  A middle position–here we might find Kant, Michael 
Walzer, J.F.C. Fuller and others–views war as a deficient condition we must avoid if possible 
but, when unavoidable, may be a justified pursuit.  I am inclined to the middle position and do 
not take up direct arguments against the other options here.  War’s necessity does not imply 
requirements for its frequency and ferocity.  In short, it may be necessary; even so it will still 
remain a normative arena.  Moreover, war’s dubious moral status may imply that it is best left 
aside or even rigorously opposed.  However, opposing war through abstinence may border on 
quixotic and ignores the possibility that there are things worth defending by lethal violence.  
Wherever our sympathies may lie, we are inclined to agree with Clausewitz that war is a deadly 
serious activity.  However, if we do not want to be “irresponsible enthusiasts,” we come very 
quickly to the task of determining how we might be responsible “enthusiasts,” or at least 
participants, in war.  This will be the line of departure for my paper: war is a deadly serious 
business that requires a normative perspective and investigation.   
The philosophical and legal tradition known as Just War Theory is the best place to start 
an investigation into the norms of war.  Just War Theory has been influential in the formation of 
the international laws governing war, and the best defender of Just War Theory is Michael 
2 
Walzer. The norms that govern personal self-defense are fundamental to Walzer’s defense of Just 
War Theory in Just and Unjust Wars.  The putative right of nations to defend their sovereignty 
against unjust attack is central to his claims that justify the resort to war.  Furthermore, Walzer’s 
account of permissible warfare derives from the norms of defensive force that are appropriate to 
the moral reality of personal self-defense in a war. The claim for a state’s right to national 
defense draws its strength, almost exclusively, from our intuitions about personal defense.  In 
this way the right of individual self-defense serves to justify the resort to war.  Just as an 
individual is morally permitted to use violence to defend herself, so is a nation permitted to go to 
war for its own collective defense.  Additionally, the limits imposed on the practice of war by 
Just War Theory and international law purport to be similar to the limits that guide acts of self-
defense.  In this way the right of national defense serves to govern our practice of war.   
The apparently intuitive relationship between national defense and personal defense has 
recently come under effective attack from David Rodin in War & Self-Defense.  In addition to 
Rodin’s censure, Jeff McMahan argues that the central tenets of Walzer’s position on the norms 
of warfare are inconsistent with the norms of defensive force.  In particular, McMahan seeks to 
undercut Walzer’s claim that the norms of warfare stand independent of the norms regarding the 
resort to war and are therefore the same for all combatants, regardless of the justice of their cause 
for war.  These two attacks from Rodin and McMahan form a considerable challenge to the 
apparent normative force given to Just War Theory by the norms of personal defense. 
The viability and consequences of the conceptual and normative analogies between 
personal and national defense for the norms of war are the concern of my thesis.  My contention 
is that the arguments of Rodin and McMahan point to deep problems within Just War Theory but 
that some elements of Just War Theory can be salvaged.  At the same time, the path that enables 
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Just War Theory to be salvaged in part–a normative conception of sovereignty developed by 
Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman–closes the door to any cogent response to the 
arguments of McMahan.  In short, resort to war can be justified on grounds of national defense, 
but the idea that the same norms apply to just and unjust combatants is dubious. 
My argument will take three basic steps.  In this chapter I will show the deep dependence 
of Just War Theory on the norms of defensive force by an examination of Walzer’s position.  In 
Chapter II I will show how Rodin’s attacks undermine Just War Theory’s primary cause to 
justify the resort to war.  In Chapter III I will lay out Jeff McMahan’s arguments for a different 
morality of war and show why Walzer’s central tenets might be subject to his criticism.  Finally, 
in Chapter IV I will use the Altman and Wellman conception of sovereignty to reclaim the right 
to national defense and apply its normative weight to the norms of warfare.  The principal 
consequence of my argument is that, contrary to Just War Theory, the normative foundation that 
can justify the resort to war ought to inform the norms we prescribe to those who prosecute that 
war.  In the remainder of this introduction, I explain Walzer’s Just War Theory. 
 Just War Theory represents a centuries-long distillation of our considered moral and legal 
reflections about war and its practice.  While it is debatable whether Just War Theory has had 
significant success at ameliorating the frequency or ferocity of war, it is clear that Just War 
Theory has had significant influence on international law regulating the resort to war and 
international humanitarian law regulating warfare.  The influence of Just War Theory on 
international law in this regard is so strong that, insofar as we might judge current international 
law as correct with regard to war, we should also extend that judgment to Just War Theory.  
Michael Walzer’s work in Just and Unjust Wars is a near canonical statement of Just War 
Theory and its central tenets.  As such, I will use his views to provide a general exposition of the 
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norms currently governing the practice of war and warfare that constitute the status quo in both 
Just War Theory and international law.  
The first part of Just War Theory concerns jus ad bellum, or the justice of a resort to war.  
Jus ad bellum is traditionally held to have six criteria:  just cause, i.e., a grievance or wrong 
whose reconciliation can justify the resort to war; right intention, i.e., the intended aim of the war 
is only the reconciliation of the wrong received and no other aim; competent authority, i.e., the 
resort to war is only within the purview of a competent government; necessity, i.e., the resort to 
military force is necessary for the aim in question; reasonable hope of success, i.e., the war must 
be reasonably sure of having the intended effect; and proportionality, i.e., the goods the war 
achieves sufficiently counterbalance the evils that attend its prosecution.  All these criteria are 
taken as necessary conditions for a just war but one is clearly predominating–just cause.  This is 
so because we cannot begin to take stock of the other criteria without the presence of a just 
cause.  The only goods that we may consider in a proportionality calculation are the goods 
stipulated by the just cause.  Stated another way, we cannot offset the ills of war by the 
anticipated advance of medicine or technology in a wartime economy because these goals are not 
just causes for war.   Similarly, war is only necessary insofar as it is a last resort for the 
satisfaction of a just cause and not other ancillary considerations such as the ability to leverage 
diplomatic or technological advantages.   
Only the presence of a just cause allows consideration of the other jus ad bellum criteria, 
and the clearest case of a putative just cause for war is self-defense.  In the history of Just War 
Theory there are two general strategies for grounding this putative right.  These strategies are 
related to two general perspectives from which we can consider the norms that govern war and 
its conduct.1  With Thomas Nagel and others we can take it that “war, conflict, and aggression 
5 
are relations between persons.”2  War is a human act that occurs between persons on a 
battlefield.  As Nagel states, “[h]ostility is a personal relation.”3  This means that the norms that 
govern war can be drawn from the norms that govern simple interpersonal relationships.  
Viewing war as a state of affairs among individuals leads one to the “reduction” strategy.  
According to this strategy the right of national self-defense is strictly reducible to the 
individual’s right to personal defense and takes two forms.  In one form, national self-defense is 
seen as simply many individuals executing their right of self-defense at the same time and in an 
organized fashion.  In its second form, the reductive strategy views national self-defense as the 
state exercising the personal right to defense on behalf of its citizens.    
The other perspective, from Michael Walzer and others, takes war to be a relation 
“between political entities and their human instruments.”4  Here we may view war as “an 
instrument of policy.”5  That is, war is collective violence that is political in nature.  As such, its 
norms will be political norms that govern the actions and rights of groups and their members.  If 
we take the second perspective and give the primary moral status to states or groups this leads 
one to conceptualize the relationship between self-defense and national-defense by way of the 
analogical strategy.  This strategy holds that the national right is a close analogue to the personal 
right.  The essence of this view is that the national right should bear a close normative 
relationship to the personal right, viz., the norms that govern each right’s practice.  This brings us 
to Walzer’s theory of jus ad bellum and a just cause for war. 
Walzer’s view is that all just causes can be expressed simply as the resistance to 
aggression because aggression “is a singular and undifferentiated crime” that “challenges rights 
worth dying for.”6  Indeed, he calls jus ad bellum the “theory of aggression.”7 Simply put, 
resistance to aggression in the form of self or other defense is the “paradigm” that forms our 
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“moral comprehension of war.”8 It does this by way of the “domestic analogy”9 in which “the 
world of states” is a “political society the character of which is entirely accessible through such 
notions as … self-defense.”10  In our moral reasoning states take the status of individuals in civil 
society.  Aggression challenges rights in the international order in the same way that crime 
challenges rights in civil society.  It is this challenge to a state’s rights–“the common life”11 
created by its political community, territory and people–that can justify the state’s resort to war, 
and it is only the defense of these rights that can supply a state with a legitimate reason to fight.   
If we look at what Walzer means by a nation’s “common life,” then the reliance on the 
analogy between personal self-defense and national self-defense in Walzer’s “theory of 
aggression” becomes clear. One’s right to life or personal autonomy grounds the permissibility 
of violent personal self-defense.  This is also true in Walzer’s “theory of aggression.” The 
principal right at work in the “common life” of a people worth defending is autonomy, or in 
Walzer’s terms “self-determination.”12   This is the right of a nation to a political process that is 
its own, and worthy of defense against existential threats and external intervention or 
interference.  It is the right of “a group to shape their own political institutions and the right of 
individual” group members “to live under institutions so shaped.”13  For Walzer, the most 
important implication of the domestic analogy is that when an act of personal self-defense is 
permissible, a like act of national self-defense is also permissible.  
Walzer’s “theory of aggression” is remarkably similar to international law.  Indeed, the 
United Nations Charter is virtually identical with Just War Theory in this regard.  Article 2(4) 
states that nations “shall refrain … from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state.”14 Furthermore, states shall not use force in any way 
inconsistent with international law.  This serves as an explicit prohibition against the use of force 
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in international affairs.  The Charter, however, offers two exceptions to this rule in Article 51.  
These are: “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” against an armed attack, 
and any actions necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”15 For Walzer 
any such maintenance or restoration of international order is defensive resistance to aggression.  
Indeed, though the Charter does not couch such actions in Walzer’s terms, the operative history 
of the United Nations suggests it sanctions military action only in response to aggressive force.  
In this we can see the explanatory power of Walzer’s “theory of aggression” and how it accords 
with common conceptions of justifying war.  Resistance to an unjust attack on our political and 
territorial integrity is a paradigm case for a just war in both Just War Theory and international 
law.  If anything justifies war, resistance to aggression through the defense of the state does.  
This justification, both in theory and law, rests on the permissibility of defensive force.      
 The second part of Just War Theory concerns jus in bello, or justice in war.  There are 
four elements of jus in bello that are central to Walzer’s position.  The first is that combatants 
enjoy an equal moral standing that justifies their enmity and lethal actions towards one another.  
Provided combatants do nothing to violate their status–for example they don’t use means mala in 
se, or banned weapons–then they share an equal right to kill one another as opportunity allows.  
The second element is the strict immunity of non-combatants from being the intended targets of 
military force.  The third is the requirement of discrimination, i.e., that combatants must make 
concerted efforts to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets in the application of 
lethal force.  Finally is the requirement of proportionality.  All of a combatant’s individual and 
collective military actions must, through consideration of its intended and unintended 
consequences, be proportionate to their aims.   
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Walzer supports these elements with three tenets of Just War Theory.  These are: the 
“independence” thesis, that is that matters of jus in bello are logically independent of matters of 
jus ad bellum; the “symmetry” thesis,16 that is that all combatants are members of a certain class 
that can permissibly be targeted with military force–what Walzer calls the “moral equality of 
soldiers;”17 finally, the “immunity” thesis which states that civilian or non-combatant immunity 
is irrevocable.  I will take each of Walzer’s tenets in turn. 
The first tenet of the Just War Theory, the independence thesis, is that jus in bello and jus 
ad bellum are distinct moral questions.  The sources of this distinction are historical.  Our moral 
perspectives on war come from two dominant sources.  From the traditions of aristocracy and 
chivalry we receive the ideas of jus in bello – that there is a morally unobjectionable way to fight 
in war that rests on a soldier’s adherence to a set of recognized norms.  On the other hand, there 
is the jurist and Christian tradition that produced the concepts of jus ad bellum–that war is a 
deficient moral state in which only one side may be said to act justly.  In Walzer’s eyes the 
upshot of the division is a pragmatically advantageous result of providing two normative 
frameworks to limit the disasters of war. 
For Walzer the independence thesis is at first a straightforward claim:  “The two sorts of 
judgment [i.e. jus in bello and jus ad bellum] are logically independent.”18 The most important 
consequent of his insistence on logical independence is that “[i]t is perfectly possible for a just 
war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules.”19  
What this means is that a war may be a crime, but the warfare that constitutes it not criminal.  
Moreover, a war may be justified, but its prosecution manifestly criminal.  Walzer is not shy 
about the “puzzling” nature of this claim.  For him there is a latent tension between questions 
about the ends of war, jus ad bellum, and the means of war, jus in bello.  For Walzer, this tension 
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seems to be a simple fact of the “moral reality of war.”20 It is the only way to balance the rights 
of the individual in war with the rights of the group or state at war.  When we judge the fighting 
of a war, “we abstract from all considerations of the justice of the cause.”21 We do this because 
the rights of the individuals in question–the combatants and noncombatants of all parties–are 
largely the same.  Walzer’s argument for this claim concerns the final two tenets and brings to 
bear the considerations of how one may go about forfeiting the right to life and become the 
rightful target of defensive force. 
The second tenet of Just War Theory, the symmetry thesis, is that soldiers enjoy a moral 
equality implying a set of rules, liberties and rights that each combatant holds equally, regardless 
of the putative justice of their war.  This includes, among other things, the right to apply lethal 
force to the enemy. Walzer’s formulation of this tenet stems from two arguments to ground the 
equal moral status of soldiers.  The first is an argument from mutual consent of the combatants.  
Soldiers who enter voluntarily into a war agree, if only tacitly, to the moral equality of 
combatants and all that it entails.  So long as they adhere to the rules, all their actions are 
justified.  Walzer’s second argument is an exculpatory argument based on the instrumental role 
of soldiers in war.  Soldiers are the “human instruments”22 of nations at war and as such are 
morally equal to one another.  Walzer states the arguments succinctly: 
… when soldiers fight freely, choosing one another as enemies and 
designing their own battles, their war is not a crime; when they fight 
without freedom, their war is not their crime.  In both cases, military 
conduct is governed by rules; but in the first the rules rest on mutuality 
and consent, in the second on shared servitude.23 
 
This is the essence of Walzer’s argument for the symmetry thesis.  That is, the justice of one’s 
war bears no significant impact on the permissions and prohibitions on your conduct.  Rather, 
these permissions and prohibitions accrue to you as a matter of class distinction.  Simply being a 
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combatant in a war grants certain moral sanctions and liabilities because combatants possess the 
capacity to threaten harm.  One’s capacity to threaten harm or actually harm others in this way is 
the act through which the combatant has “surrendered or lost his rights.”24  
 Walzer’s claims for noncombatant immunity flow directly from his claims for combatant 
equality.  Just as there is a class of combatants that we may permissibly kill, there is also a class 
of noncombatants that we may never intentionally kill.  As he states: “noncombatants cannot be 
attacked at any time.  They can never be the objects or the targets of military activity.”25  In Just 
War Theory noncombatants occupy the class of “innocents” who are never the rightful targets of 
military force.   Moreover, the term “innocent” in the context of Just War Theory does not 
concern moral guilt or innocence.  Rather, Walzer intends something more like “bystander” or 
one not currently engaged in “harmful” action.26  This is clear enough, but there is one 
qualification.  For Walzer, traditional noncombatants can lose their status and be “incorporated 
into hell”27 by their actions.  Almost no consideration can bear on the prohibition against 
intentionally targeting noncombatants.  Rather, the critical question is that of which acts count 
for “assimilation” into the “class of combatants.”28 Acts of this sort are those that are “peculiarly 
warlike”29 such as working in a munitions factory or sailing a merchant ship ferrying those 
munitions in a time of war.  In the performance of these actions, noncombatants contribute 
directly to the war effort and have the unhappy privilege of achieving a more permissible status. 
  The symmetry thesis and the immunity of noncombatants provide Walzer with the basis 
for the claims of the independence thesis.  Regardless of the putative justice of a war, the 
individuals caught within its calamity still have rights.  These rights form the basis for the jus in 
bello requirements of discrimination and proportionality.  One may only target those who are 
combatants.  Also, one can only target combatants in a way that does not cause an unnecessary 
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amount of suffering, and is in accordance with the aims of the war, the proportionality 
requirement.   
Like Walzer’s “theory of aggression,” his three tenets above have enjoyed influence on 
the actual laws that constitute international humanitarian law.  These laws are virtually 
indistinguishable from Walzer’s “war convention.”  They concern the rights of individuals and 
base these rights on distinctions similar to Walzer’s class distinctions.  Combatants hold an equal 
right to fight and kill one another, and noncombatants hold the same immunities for which 
Walzer argues.30      
Just War Theory and its best apologist, Michael Walzer, offer a moral conception of war 
and warfare that is compelling and explanatorily powerful.  It has been successfully codified into 
the laws that govern international relations and international conflict.  The foundational principle 
of Michael Walzer’s position is the justice of defensive force.  In matters of jus ad bellum the 
defense of the state against aggression is the paradigm case of a just cause for war.  If any war is 
to be justified, we should expect defense against stark aggression to fit the bill.  In matters of jus 
in bello the rights of individuals come to turn on their capacity and currency as sources of threat.  
Combatants, as a class, have an enduring capacity to pose a threat and are thereby permissible 
recipients of lethal military force.  Noncombatants, as a class, pose no threat.  Insofar as they 
maintain this status, they hold the right of immunity to any military force. 
Just War Theory has been successful and influential in almost every respect, and no 
expression of that theory has as much authority as Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars.  
However, the powerful intuitive legitimacy of Walzer’s view has not rendered it immune from 
philosophical criticism.  His critics have taken issue with many of its central ideas.  In the next 
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chapter I examine David Rodin’s attack on Walzer’s central jus ad bellum claim that a war of 
national defense is a paradigm case for a justified war. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL-DEFENSE 
The resort to military force is apparently most justified when it involves national-defense, 
i.e., when a nation has been attacked and its only recourse to reestablish the status quo ante 
bellum is to engage its attacker with force of arms.  The two most familiar arguments for this 
national right to self-defense are the reduction of the right to the personal rights of the state’s 
constituency and the attempt to draw a normatively analogous relationship between the personal 
right and its national corollary.  David Rodin, in his book War & Self-Defense, casts doubt on the 
viability of either of these arguments. His basic contention is that self-defense is a normative 
relationship that stipulates permissions and proscriptions on defensive force that are not 
operative in national-defense by means of war. The “reductive” and “analogical” arguments thus 
fail.  This failure is principally due, in each case, to their inability to provide a normatively 
substantive end or good that can generate normative limits on defensive force.  I will deal only 
with Rodin’s arguments against the analogical strategy and its attempt to build some sort of 
normative relationship between self-defense and national-defense.   
Rodin’s method of argument develops as follows.  If self-defense and national-defense 
are normatively analogous, then national-defense should have a normative end that the right 
seeks to protect as the self-defense case does.  If there is such an end, it should generate 
normative limits on the operation of national-defense.  Rodin gives us reasons to doubt that such 
normative limits exist, which he attributes to the analogical strategy’s inability to provide a 
normative end.  This failure being the case, he claims that self-defense and national-defense are 
crucially disanalogous.   This is a striking claim, directly attacking Walzer’s domestic analogy.  
As we have seen, the apparent normative relationship between self-defense and national-defense 
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places national-defense as a paradigm case of a just cause in jus ad bellum.  If this relationship 
proves problematic, it would seem to point to a fatal flaw that undermines the central jus ad 
bellum claim of Just War Theory.   
The Baseline 
Rodin begins War & Self-Defense with a thorough account of the personal right to self-
defense.  His account establishes the conceptual elements and normative standards operative in 
the individual right to self-defense.  For my purposes here, I will not take issue with his 
argument for the individual right and deal with his account only insofar as it is necessary to make 
his view of self-defense clear.  For, if the analogical strategy is to ground national-defense, it is 
the individual right that will serve as the conceptual and normative baseline for the collective 
right.  Self-defense is a normative relationship between two moral agents created by an unjust 
attack.  As such, there are normative criteria that serve to establish the presence of such a 
relationship, and there are norms that govern justifiable acts within this relationship.  If there is 
to be a conceptual analogy between self-defense and national-defense, as the analogical 
argument stipulates, then we should expect instances of these two rights to look much the same. 
Moreover, if there is to be a normative analogy, as the analogical argument requires, the criteria 
that establish and the norms that govern an instance of self-defense should have some analogue 
in an instance of national-defense.     
To make sense of Rodin’s arguments and a normative relationship between self-defense 
and national-defense we need a notion of objectivity.   Objectivity, for Rodin, means a value that 
is “trans-culturally valid.”1  An account of national-defense needs this sort of objectivity for two 
reasons.  First, the inference we are investigating is one from self-defense to national-defense.  In 
self-defense the ends protected by defensive acts must have a value proportional to the harm 
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inflicted.  However, the determination of that value is not solely a question of the defender’s 
assessment, but of other parties as well; so too with questions of national-defense.  A second 
reason to search for cross-cultural objectivity is the fact that the operation of a right to national-
defense will cross cultural boundaries; therefore, its end must be one that most cultures similarly 
esteem or should esteem. 
Rodin develops and defends a rights-based account of self-defense as a species of a larger 
set of defensive rights. As he states, the “right of defense exists when a subject is at liberty to 
defend a certain good by … an action which would otherwise be impermissible.”2  Such rights, 
as he lays out, arise out of the “normative relationships” created by the interaction of four 
elements in a situation of self-defense:   
(i)   The subject or right holder  
(ii)  The quality of the act of defense  
(iii) The object of the defensive act  
(iv) The end–that which the subject seeks to defend3 
 
Anyone seeking moral justification for acts of self-defense is subject to three norms governing 
action.  (1) One must bear a proper normative relation to the end; Rodin characterizes this as 
satisfied by a “right to, or a duty of care towards” the end in question.  (2) The act must be a 
“proportionate, necessary response to an imminent threat.”  (3) The object and the subject must 
bear the correct normative relationship, namely, that the object is morally responsible for the 
threat and the subject is morally innocent.4 
 Two examples will help lay out what the conceptual relationship between self-defense 
and national-defense might look like.  Using Rodin’s criteria and norms above, an instance of 
permissible self-defense would look like this: 
Stroller A (the right holder) is walking through Woodruff park when Mugger B (the 
object) assaults him.  Because B is armed with a pistol, A has reason to believe that his 
life (the end) is in danger.  Also, B is apparently clever and left no avenue of escape to A, 
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so flight is not an option.  Through a ruse of going into his rucksack for his wallet, A is 
able to confuse and then disarm B by a non-lethal strike (quality). 
 
In this account, A’s actions satisfy (1-3) above:  he had a right to life (1), his action was 
necessary, proportionate and in response to an imminent threat (2), and we can assume that A 
had done nothing to warrant B’s attack and that B is morally responsible for his conduct (3).  
Now consider an apparent instance of permissible national-defense: 
Country B (the object) unjustly attacks and begins occupation of its resource-rich 
neighbor Country A (the right holder).  Because of the occupation and a long history of 
aggression by B, A has reason to believe that its sovereignty and the rights of its citizens 
(the end) are in danger.  Moreover, because of the geo-political situation, A has little to 
no hope of an external check on B’s attack.  Through force of arms A’s military 
prosecutes a successful counter attack that restores the original border between A and B 
(quality). 
 
In this account, A’s actions putatively satisfy (1-3) above:  A holds a right to sovereignty and a 
duty of care towards its citizens (1), the counter-attack was necessary, proportionate, and 
responded to an imminent threat (2), and A had done nothing to warrant B’s attack and that B is 
morally responsible for its conduct (3).  This is roughly how the analogical argument sees the 
conceptual and normative relationship between self-defense and national-defense.   
The examples above highlight how national-defense enjoys “enormous intuitive 
legitimacy from the analogy with personal self-defense.”5  This applies both to the conceptual as 
well as the normative analogy of the two rights.  As we have seen, the apparent legitimacy of this 
analogy runs so deep that current international law is formulated in accordance with the criteria 
and norms above.  Because of this similarity, we can expect international law to codify the 
normative criteria and limits operative in national-defense.  In terms of criteria, national-defense 
in international law gives to states a “Hohfeldian liberty” to use defensive force.  As Rodin 
states:   
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States are constituted by their existence as sovereign entities and they have the 
claim-right against other states not to destroy their political independence or 
interfere in their territorial integrity.6 
 
Given the putative relationship between self-defense and national-defense, international law 
views national-defense as a right.  The analogous normative criteria in national-defense are: the 
state is the right holder, and the end it defends is its sovereignty.   
Rodin challenges this analogy because “sovereignty is a factual and not a normative 
concept.”7  As such it is an “empty vessel”8 that cannot generate normative limits on the 
operation of national-defense that are analogous with self-defense.  Rodin supports this claim by 
looking to the current limits on national-defense in international law.  The first sign of trouble 
comes when we try to and establish normative limits that can guide the exercise of the right 
involved in national-defense.  If we find, as Rodin does, the current normative limits on national-
defense in international law to be disanalogous with the limits operative in self-defense, then we 
might have reason to doubt the presence of a sufficiently normative end at work in national-
defense.  We might agree that sovereignty is an “empty vessel” of ineffective normative worth. 
A Lack of Normativity 
 Rodin claims the current limits on national-defense in international law are disanalogous 
with the limits on self-defense.  That is, they lack a sufficient level of normativity to be held 
analogous to the limits on self-defense.  If the national right had the same normativity of 
personal right, there should be similar limitations to the rights.  Those limitations are necessity, 
imminence, and proportionality.9  As he explores these limits in the context of national-defense 
Rodin begins to foreshadow the breakdown of the analogy between national and self-defense.  
Taking each limitation in turn he demonstrates how the analogy begins to falter under its own 
weight.  
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Necessity in self-defense is both an enabling and limiting criterion–one is only permitted 
to use that force which is necessary to thwart an unjust attack that one cannot avoid.  If I strike a 
lucky blow in the opening moments of a mugging and render the assailant unconscious, I am not 
justified or allowed to strike a further lethal finishing blow.  In national-defense, Rodin claims, 
necessity acts only as an enabling criterion.  That is, necessity applies to “the commencement of 
a conflict, not throughout the war.”10  International law offers little guidance on when or if a state 
must end a war.  Moreover, it is customary for states to fight beyond the simple restoration of the 
status quo ante bellum.  For Rodin, the goal of war in national-defense is not the simple 
restoration of a right violated.  Rather, it is intermixed with a legacy of “punishment, reparation, 
and revenge.”11     
The imminence requirement in self-defense is a derivative concept of necessity and 
requires that the use of defensive force “must be neither too soon or too late.”12  That is, for a 
threat to be a legitimate target of self-defense it must be imminent, and to be imminent it must be 
about to happen.  However, there is hardly a consensus operative in international law regarding 
imminence and national-defense.  This is so for two reasons, and both relate to “the distinction 
between pre-emptive and preventive military action.”13  A preemptive military action is one that 
attacks an aggressor that both has the intention to attack and has taken steps to demonstrate that 
the attack is imminent, i.e., has massed forces on a border, or has begun the groundwork for an 
attack with a WMD.  The military action is preemptive insofar as the enemy tanks have not 
crossed the border or the WMD has not reached its target.  The preemptive strike does not need 
to wait for the aggressor to commence.  A preventive military action is one that attacks a 
potential aggressor state’s burgeoning advantage: it does not require that the other state intends 
to attack to satisfy the requirement of imminence, only for the advantage in question to be 
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decisive and make future aggression likely.  The advocates of preventive war argue that the 
standard of imminence is unjustly high.  That is, given the facts of modern war, they believe that 
to wait on circumstances to meet the standard of preemption–which entails imminence–is 
tantamount to suicide.  We may, by adhering to misguided notions, forfeit a decisive advantage 
to the enemy or miss an opportunity to thwart a particularly ruinous attack at a safer distance 
from our borders.   In a related point, there is no settled consensus on where the distinction 
between preemptive force and preventive force lies in modern war.  What is to constitute 
massing on a border when most mechanized forces can cover up to a hundred kilometers in a 
day’s march and air forces can span the globe in hours?  What is to constitute an intention to 
attack when a WMD can go from a storage house to a target city in only a few hours?   As such, 
the ideas of preemptive and preventive war offer little normative guidance and thereby will fail 
to limit the use of military force.  
The final limit to force, proportionality, also suffers from confusion in application to 
national-defense.  Rodin holds that self-defense is proportional only when the “harms inflicted” 
are “commensurate with the value of the goods and rights preserved.”14  That is, lethal defensive 
force is a proportionate response to a threat against my life but not to a threat against my having 
a certain book.  In contrast, international law and the practice of war hold that defensive use of 
force need only be proportionate to the nature and scope of the force used by the aggressor.  Here 
I do not need to gauge my action against the good I am protecting, only the means used by my 
attacker.  Rodin’s first objection is that this will not limit force in any way.  Rather, it will set a 
scale of proportionality that is “intrinsically open-ended … and subject to escalation.”15  Second, 
Rodin sees little hope of making the required comparison of the goods threatened to the means 
used to protect them. As he states:   
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If the balance we are required to make is between the harms inflicted in the course 
of war (measured in terms of number of dead, destruction of property) and the 
protection of … sovereignty, then … the task seems to require the comparison of 
incommensurables.16   
 
There is at least a prima facie difficulty with how we are to compare the loss of sovereignty and 
the death and destruction of war.  As such, it seems that proportionality, as understood in 
international law, cannot serve the limiting role in national-defense as it does in self-defense.   
On Rodin’s position the lack of normative force behind necessity, imminence, and 
proportionality as they function internationally is indicative of a normative confusion 
surrounding national-defense.  This divergence between self-defense, which enjoys clear 
normative limits, and national-defense, where the limits are blurry, is the first step in Rodin’s 
argument. The difficulties above in determining these limits point to at least two possibilities.  
On the one hand, we may have an imperfect grasp of the end that grounds the right to national-
defense.  On the other is a deeper problem for holding national-defense as analogous to self-
defense:  national-defense may lack any normative foundation at all. Rodin’s final step in the 
argument against national-defense is to affirm the latter proposition. This would mean that an 
instance of national-defense cannot have the last of the four elements present in an instance of 
self-defense–the end the subject seeks to defend.  For this reason any participant in national-
defense cannot satisfy the three norms that govern self-defense.  The inadequacy of the current 
normative foundations for national-defense is Rodin’s next target.   
The Analogy Falters 
Rodin’s charge in the last section was that there is moral confusion on the normative 
limits to force in pursuit of national-defense.  Therefore, we have cause to be suspicious of any 
analogy of normativity between self-defense and national-defense.  Specifically, we should now 
be in doubt about what end grounds national-defense.  The arguments in this section take aim at 
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defenders of the analogical strategy and their attempts to characterize such an end.  Ultimately, 
Rodin offers compelling reasons for why these commonly held conceptions fail to offer a 
normative end proportional to the use of defensive force. 
Rodin formulates three questions we must answer about national-defense to hold it as 
conceptually analogous to self-defense:   
1) Who or what holds the right of national-defense?  
2) Against whom or what is the right held?  
3) What is the value or end the right seeks to preserve?   
 
Rodin takes 3) as the most important.  As he states, “the question of the normative grounding of 
any defensive right is first and foremost … about its end.”17  The “reduction” strategy seeks as its 
end the defense of the life of the individual.  The analogical strategy seeks to defend what Rodin 
will characterize as “the ‘common life’ of the community.”18  Rodin’s attack on the reduction 
strategy is compelling; however I will deal only with his criticism of the analogical strategy. 
 The analogical strategy offers the common life as the end that justifies military resistance 
to aggression.  Rodin’s target is lofty.  The idea of the common life is a central concept for most 
modern defenders of Just War Theory.   Most notably, the common life is the end or good 
offered by Michael Walzer in his justification for the resistance to aggression.  Given the 
importance of the common life, Rodin casts a wide net that includes the three most prevalent 
expressions of the end common life.  These are: a Hobbesian account of state sovereignty as the 
end; the cultural or historical heritage of groups as the end; and political self-determination or 
autonomy as the end.  According to Rodin, all these ends fail to give an adequate ground for the 
right of national-defense.   
 In his first argument, Rodin addresses the end of political sovereignty constructed along 
Hobbesian lines.  This sovereignty rests on a state’s ability to order human affairs.  Those states 
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that can provide the advantage of community, any community, over the state of nature are 
legitimate and have authority over their own affairs and territory.  A Hobbesian conception of 
sovereignty has the sort of objectivity needed for national-defense, the argument goes, because it 
offers a minimal account of state legitimacy.  However, Rodin has a striking objection to using 
the “Hobbesian social contract”19 to support national-defense.  Instead of supporting the right of 
national-defense, the logic of Hobbes’ argument is “deeply antagonistic to it.”20  The end of the 
social contract is the security of the individual from the state of nature.  To gain security one 
joins in political association that alleviates the hardships of the primary state of nature.  
However, the operation of this contractual process creates an international state of nature that is 
just as dangerous to the security of the individual.  If the need to overcome the first state is valid, 
it seems there is also a need to overcome the second as well.  What this means is that holding a 
right to political sovereignty of smaller groups appears to be a conceptual barrier to association 
that would end international anarchy.  The concern of national-defense is not protection of the 
individual from the state of nature, but protection of a group as a distinct political entity.  
National-defense is then a right that runs counter to the normative force of a Hobbesian contract.    
The second difficulty associated with holding political sovereignty as the end needed to 
ground national-defense is that the value of a Hobbesian contract is “the value of order over … 
the state of nature.”21  Since international aggression rarely takes on the flavor of a barbarian 
horde seeking to replace political order with anarchy the Hobbesian contract would seem to 
imply “a duty to capitulate quickly.”22  It seems only to provide for defense against an aggression 
that threatened to “destroy the political life as such.”23   
At this point one may object that Rodin’s arguments simply show that the Hobbesian 
account of legitimate sovereignty is too threadbare and permissive.  We may object that a more 
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robust account of the way in which a state becomes legitimately sovereign would rebut Rodin’s 
arguments.  Rodin has two replies to objections of this sort.  First, any such account must 
adjudicate the defensive rights of legitimate states.  That is, if we are to take a certain, more 
successful political ordering as the basis for national-defense, then how are we to account for one 
legitimate state’s right to defend against another legitimate state if they embody the same type of 
political order?  The second, deeper reply is that we need a “moral reason not to defend order, 
but … a particular form of order.”24 
 Rodin now considers a second conception of the common life as a cultural heritage 
worth protecting.  Against this value, Rodin levels the charge that it is too subjective to ground 
national-defense.  That is, any judgment about the value of a cultural heritage is “accessible 
primarily from the internal perspective of those within the common life in question.”25 This is 
incompatible with the idea of objectivity we need for national-defense.  The values in question 
here are, almost by definition, not trans-culturally valid.    Furthermore, Rodin argues that the 
substantive moral judgments we make about certain “immoral, oppressive, or unjust”26 
communities complicate the picture. There are communities that, because of systemic human 
rights violations, we hold to be objectionable.  Moreover, their cultural heritage is the very 
quality we see as objectionable and as an end unworthy of defense.  At the same time those 
within the objectionable culture, even those who suffer from its excess, are likely to value it and 
seek to defend it.  The mere existence of a common culture then seems unable to offer an 
objective value judgment sufficient to ground national-defense.      
 The final target is the most worthy.  Rodin turns to those who seek to ground the right of 
national-defense in the end of group autonomy or political self-determination.  Here he takes as a 
target Michael Walzer’s conception of the “common life.”  Against Walzer he levels three 
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charges.  First, that Walzer’s “common life,” if understood politically, is too subjective.  Second, 
that Walzer’s position allows the tacit endorsement of political force.  Finally, that Walzer’s 
position is insufficient to determine discrete communities.     
His first objection is that Walzer’s “common life” lacks objectivity because we seem to 
be advocating defense of only democracy.  As Rodin states: “Only in a democratic society can 
persons in a community be said to freely shape their common life and enjoy the good of 
collective self-determination.”27  Here Walzer and others would rightly object, and Rodin 
concedes, that this conflates two concepts at work in Walzer’s position – self-determination and 
political freedom.  For Walzer it is self-determination that is the “more inclusive idea” that 
“describes … a particular institutional arrangement” and the “process by which a community 
arrives at that arrangement.”28  Self-determination does not necessarily endorse only one type of 
political process.  Rather it is the larger process by which a group decides on its political 
association, institutions, and the character thereof.  It is the right to the “process” of self-
determination that is the end that can ground national-defense–a right Walzer calls “communal 
liberty.”29  The process Walzer has in mind is inclusive of everything from peaceable political 
incorporation to outright civil war.   
It is at the point of including civil war that Rodin brings in his second objection.  If self-
determination does not involve only democratic rights, it seems thereby to tacitly allow force and 
coercion.  Walzer deals with a similar objection in Just and Unjust Wars–that such a view of 
self-determination may convey legitimacy to those whose only virtue is the effective use of 
force.  Against this Walzer claims, “force could not prevail … over a people ready ‘to brave 
labor and danger’ ”30 in the process of self-determination.  However, Rodin is doubtful that any 
“military outcome can serve as an accurate proxy”31 for the results of self-determination.  Walzer 
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himself seems to echo this idea in a condemnation of the Iraqi Baathist regime’s resistance to the 
United States’ invasion in 2003. 
Self-defense is the paradigmatic case of just war, but the self in question is 
supposed to be a collective self, not a single person or tyrannical clique seeking 
desperately to hold onto power, at whatever cost to ordinary people.32   
 
Walzer claims that our convictions about the justice of a group’s defense of its self-determination 
through war are supposed to stem from the presumptive “respect that foreigners owe to a historic 
community and to its internal life.”33  The “historic community,” regardless of its shape or 
institutions, is supposed to be the “self” that grounds national-defense.  That being the case, 
Walzer’s dependence on this assumption demonstrates that his conception of self-determination 
faces serious difficulties in trying to provide a full account of a normative end that can ground 
national-defense.  Using Walzer’s view and strictly adhering to political freedom results in a 
subjective value that is insufficient to ground an objective right.  If we follow Walzer and retreat 
from a “straightforwardly political”34 definition of self-determination to account for this 
difficulty, then we are put in a position of giving normative legitimacy to simple force and 
coercion.  
There is a further difficulty in Walzer’s position that is endemic to all the attempts to base 
the right of national-defense on the rights held by or the value of social communities.  The 
“organic unity” of communities and the current international order of states are in conflict.  
Rodin sees the individual as a member of “complicated … vertically nested communities”35 
defined by the political and communal ties of families, cities, provinces, and states.  Cutting 
across these communities are “numerous horizontally ordered communities”36 such as social 
class, religious groups, and racial affiliation.  From this general conception, Rodin offers 
humanitarian intervention to protect communities within a state as an indirect argument against 
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Walzer’s position.  If “communal liberty” is the basis for the right to national-defense, then how 
is one to make sense of a situation in which the protection of a community by armed 
humanitarian intervention conflicts with a state’s right to national-defense?  Humanitarian 
intervention seems to show that “the rights of communities to autonomy and integrity do not 
underlie the defensive rights of states but … stand in direct conflict with them.”37  This first 
problem leaves us wanting some manner in which to delineate between two sorts of groups: 
those groups whose internal conflict is part of their “communal liberty, and those groups whose 
internal conflict is really just one group’s persecution of another group. This leads us to a second 
problem, namely, how are we to determine when a conflict is happening between two groups or 
within one group? From these considerations of humanitarian intervention, Rodin formulates a 
criterion required for an end to adequately account for the right of national-defense.  Any such 
end must provide a clear way of identifying particular communities.  
We have seen that the three leading arguments aimed at providing the analogical strategy 
with an end worthy of the use of defensive force have failed.  Hobbesian sovereignty, rather than 
offering any such ground, seems logically opposed to national-defense.  The second attempt, 
holding a group’s cultural heritage as an adequate end, trades on the illicit use of a subjective 
value for an objective right.  Walzer’s use of self-determination to overcome the subjectivity of 
the second attempt leads to a normative endorsement of force and coercion as an expression of 
that self-determination.  Finally, all three attempts failed to give clear indication as to how we 
might determine who or what could have such an end and thereby a right to defend it.   
Let’s take stock at this point.  The first step in Rodin’s argument demonstrated how the 
current normative limits on national-defense are disanalogous with the normative limits on self-
defense.  This leads to two possibilities: either the current limits are imperfectly related to a 
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relevant normative end, or there is no way to conceptualize an end for national-defense that can 
hold the normative force of the analogical strategy.  The second step of Rodin’s argument 
criticizes the best current attempts to conceptualize the normative end of national-defense aimed 
at affirming the latter proposition. Rodin’s criticisms demonstrated that currently national-
defense lacks a normative foundation. National-defense cannot adjudicate between the defensive 
rights of legitimate states in conflict, and it seems to alternately give and deny the defensive 
rights of illegitimate states.  A solution to these problems must also do the following:  It must be 
objective, and it must offer a way to demarcate the groups to which the end applies. Rodin 
summarizes these criteria in the following:  
What we require is a value that is both objective and particular–it must be 
objective and recognizable as valid across cultures, yet still provide a reason for 
defending a particular state or community.38 
 
If Rodin is right, there is no such value.   This is a striking predicament.  The possibility of a just 
cause based on the right of national-defense might be the normative concept underlying the 
entire framework of the Just War Theory and its answers to the questions of jus ad bellum.  If 
Rodin’s arguments deprive Just War Theory of this concept, it is not entirely clear the extent to 
which the traditional theory could retain any of its relevance in our discussions of the justice of a 
state or group’s resort to war. 
 David Rodin’s arguments in War & Self-defense give reasons to question a central feature 
to Michael Walzer’s “theory of aggression.”  In the next chapter I will take up Jeff McMahan’s 
arguments against Walzer’s theory of jus in bello that he calls “the war convention.”  
McMahan’s aim is to establish a view of war’s morality that is antagonistic to “the war 
convention” and therefore at odds with the jus in bello tenets of Just War Theory.  By trying to 
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understand war’s morality from the norms of individual self-defense, McMahan calls into 
question the “independence,” “symmetry,” and immunity theses.  
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CHAPTER 3. 
THE DEEP MORALITY OF WAR 
 The guiding norm of Just War Theory is the permissibility of defensive force.  For 
questions of jus ad bellum, the permissibility of defensive force is supposed to ground acts of 
national-defense as clear-cut cases of a just cause for war.  In the last chapter, I argued that 
Rodin effectively criticized Just War Theory in this respect and gave us reasons to doubt that the 
permissibility of self-defense is normatively analogous to national-defense.  In this chapter I will 
argue that the three tenets of Just War Theory that undergird its conception of jus in bello–the 
independence thesis, the symmetry thesis, and the immunity thesis–are similarly inconsistent 
with the permissibility of defensive force. The foremost critic of these tenets is Jeff McMahan 
and I will focus on his four central arguments against Just War Theory and the work of Walzer.  
McMahan offers compelling arguments against Just War Theory that aim at revealing what he 
calls the “deep morality of war.”  My contention will be that, in principle, the arguments of 
McMahan carry and give us reason to think that the current Just War Theory answers to jus in 
bello questions are not consistent with the norms of defensive force or the “deep morality of 
war.”  The loss of these theses renders a very different conception of the moral reality of war.  
Just War Theory splits war’s morality into questions of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, but 
McMahan’s arguments expose a connection between the two branches.   
 McMahan’s arguments use a number of terminological distinctions.  First is the 
distinction McMahan makes between “just combatants” (hereafter JC) and “unjust combatants” 
(hereafter UJC).1  The distinction is straightforward enough.  JCs are those who fight in a war for 
a just cause, whereas, UJCs fight in a war for an unjust cause.  Second, McMahan’s use of 
“innocent” is different from its use in Just War Theory and bears some clarifying remarks.  The 
key here is to understand what McMahan believes makes a moral agent “innocent in the relative 
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sense.”2  We must first see that innocence does not speak directly to a lack of guilt.  Rather, it 
concerns only “the permissibility of killing.”3 That is, one has the presumptive right against 
attack and is thereby innocent. But, one can forfeit that right through actions and become non-
innocent.  McMahan states that the innocent “have done nothing to lose their right not to be 
attacked.”4  This is what it means to be “innocent in the relative sense.”  For McMahan, those 
who are innocent are those who have done nothing to forfeit their presumptive right not to be 
attacked; likewise, the non-innocent are those who have.  This notion of innocence is very much 
in line with Just War Theory.  However, where McMahan is unorthodox is his account of how 
one may move from the category of innocent to non-innocent.  Just War Theory holds that one’s 
innocence turns on whether or not one poses a threat to others.  As Walzer makes clear, it is the 
“arms that make … an army.”5  In contrast, as we will see, McMahan will cash out his 
conception of innocence along the lines of moral responsibility and just cause.  
The Surprise Attack Argument 
McMahan’s first argument is the “surprise attack” argument and aims to show that the 
independence thesis and the symmetry thesis are not consistent with permissive defensive force.  
It attacks the former by demonstrating how our decision about the just or unjust status of a 
combatant depends on jus ad bellum considerations and not jus in bello considerations.  It attacks 
the latter by demonstrating that in a likely wartime situation, it is counter-intuitive to hold to the 
“moral equality of soldiers.”  
 The “surprise attack” argument unfolds like this.  Suppose Country A launches an unjust 
surprise attack on Country B.  However, B’s military is either garrisoned or in a purely defensive 
posture.  If A’s military targets only B’s military, then the traditional Just War Theory view of 
jus in bello would hold that they (A) are justified in their actions, that they do no wrong by 
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attacking “legitimate targets.”6  Recalling the disposition of B’s military, McMahan claims that 
this justification is incompatible with the presumptive rights of the defenders.  Traditional Just 
War Theory holds that only one’s participation in threatening acts renders one noninnocent.  
Since they are not engaged in threatening activity, B’s forces are innocent in the “relevant 
sense.”7  It would seem that, rather than justifying A’s application of military force to B, the 
conception of innocence at work in Just War Theory condemns such actions.  This leaves us in 
an uncomfortable position.  We can maintain B’s status as combatants and therefore legitimate 
targets only at the “cost of forfeiting the traditional theory’s grounds for claiming that all 
combatants are legitimate targets of attack.”8  Recall that the Just War Theory grounds for 
holding B’s forces as legitimate targets was that all combatants were non-innocent.  But in 
McMahan’s scenario B’s forces do not offer threat and are thereby innocent.  So in this first 
instance of the argument, the moral symmetry of combatants seems inconsistent with the 
traditional view of jus in bello innocence.  Since the conception of innocence in question is 
derived from the norms of defensive force, it would appear that the symmetry thesis is in conflict 
with these norms.  
One possible response to the argument would be to tinker slightly with the status of B’s 
forces in one of two ways.  First, we could hold B’s forces in some sort of “conditional 
combatant”9 status.  In one sense, this status could mean something similar to Walzer’s argument 
to ground the symmetry of combatants on the consent of the combatants in question.  The 
members of B’s forces have, by joining the military, consented to the risk of being killed and 
such consent also involves the implicit or tacit consent to being killed.  However, here McMahan 
finds support in David Rodin’s objection to Walzer’s argument from consent.  This objection 
turns on a distinction between a combatant’s consent and her acknowledgement of a necessary 
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fact about war.  That is, in war people die, and it is perfectly clear that soldiers very quickly 
accept this fact.  However, it is one thing to accept one’s death as a likely result of an activity 
and another to consent to that death.  As Rodin remarks, combatants “fight knowing they may be 
killed, but they do not thereby permit their enemies to kill them.”10  The argument from consent 
appears to trade on a view of war as a gruesome sport.  The rules are set, the stakes are clear, and 
soldiers regard their lives the way they regard a critical piece in a game of chess.  But such a 
view of war is not an ethically attractive one.   
The members of B’s military could also be “conditional combatants” in a second sense:  
they pose a conditional threat because they will fight if they or their country were attacked.  
McMahan rejects any such solution because it would render the distinction between combatant 
and noncombatant as strictly arbitrary.  Any number of persons or classes could be reasonably 
expected to fight should they or their country come under attack.  Why, then, limit the initial 
attack to only military personnel?  The result “empties the distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant of any significant content”11 in a way that is clearly intolerable. 
Another response to the “surprise attack” argument might be to stick hard with the 
traditional conception of innocence and hold B’s forces as “military noncombatants”12 retaining 
their immunity.  This is more tolerable, as it ostensibly limits violence and serves as a moral 
check on unjust attacks.  However, for McMahan it also undermines the symmetry thesis.  For, it 
holds that UJCs can participate in an unjust war and abide by the principles of jus in bello.  But 
in this case, if B’s forces are “military noncombatants,” then A’s attack violates the principles of 
jus in bello.  In this one case, abiding by jus in bello is one thing that UJCs cannot do. 
For some adherents of the traditional theory, this result may seem to be an acceptable 
qualification or caveat to the base theory because it limits and checks war and condemns 
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aggressive action.  But this concession, however beneficial, does not relieve the initial trouble for 
the symmetry thesis and glosses over a troubling result of this line of reasoning.  For McMahan 
the concession implies two things.  First, UJCs in the initial invasion do wrong, but that 
subsequent actions of these UJCs and follow-on forces are justified by simply acting in 
accordance with the demands of jus in bello.  For, in response to the attack, B’s forces may begin 
to resist the invasion.  Once they have begun a counter-attack or active defense, they pose a 
threat to A’s forces and thereby become legitimate targets.  However, this is still in conflict with 
the symmetry thesis because not all combatants share a moral equality.  We would still have 
reason to hold the initial wave of A’s forces as UJCs and the follow-on forces of A and B’s 
defensive forces as JCs.  Second, the concession seems to imply that all one need to do is provide 
adequate warning to those under attack.  So long as you grant sufficient time for your enemy to 
posture, you can satisfy the requirements of jus in bello.  This result, for McMahan, would give 
credence to the criticism that Just War Theory is “nothing more than a quaint chivalric code”13 
that we should be rid of to our advantage.    
A variation of the “surprise attack” argument aims to cast doubt on the independence 
thesis.  By slightly changing the conditions of the argument, McMahan demonstrates that we 
ought to alter our judgments of A’s combatants because of the considerations of jus ad bellum 
and not jus in bello.  Suppose that B’s security forces were spilt into a purely defensive military, 
say B1, and paramilitary internal security force, say B2.  Now, suppose that B2 is conducting the 
genocide of a minority population in B and that B1 is, or will, protect B from outside 
interference.  It would seem in this case that A’s forces, given they satisfy certain jus ad bellum 
requirements, would be justified in launching the same surprise attack.  Moreover, their forces 
would be, provided they abide by the dictates of jus in bello, JCs. For McMahan this “is 
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inconsistent with the traditional theory’s insistence that jus in bello is independent of jus ad 
bellum”14–the independence thesis.  This is so because what justifies the action of A’s 
combatants–what makes them JCs now–is not some different, morally correct form or warfare 
that they follow–that is, a practice more in line with jus in bello.  Rather it is the satisfaction of 
the requirements of just ad bellum–most importantly, a just cause of humanitarian intervention. 
The Asymmetry Argument    
 McMahan’s “asymmetry” argument is a simple one that relies on the norms at work in 
self-defense and national-defense.  The argument aims to give further reasons to doubt that the 
independence thesis and the symmetry thesis are consistent with the norms of defensive force.  In 
particular, these theses falsely assume that all defensive force is justified.  McMahan draws out 
this error by using a simple instance of self-defense to show that there is a normative asymmetry 
between the attacker and a defender in a criminal assault. 
The first premise of the argument recalls that Just War Theory grounds the permissibility 
of defensive force in the status of innocence.  The noninnocent, regardless of the justice of their 
war, are in some capacity threatening harm and thereby are the permissible targets of defensive 
force.  But this is not the same for a typical instance of individual self-defense.  During the act of 
self-defense, I become a threat to an unjust attacker.  However, simply because I am now 
threatening the attacker, I do not thereby become a permissible target of his defensive repulse of 
my counter-attack.  If this were the case, we might reach a counter-intuitive position:  “If 
defensive force is permissible, the fact that you now pose a threat to your attacker makes it 
permissible for him to attack you.”15  So there is reason to doubt that all defensive force, simply 
by being defensive, is justified.  
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The upshot of McMahan’s “asymmetry” argument is that the independence and 
symmetry theses are subject to further, difficult objections.  As he states:   
It is false that unjust combatants do no wrong to fight provided they respect the 
rules of engagement. And it is false, a fortiori, that jus in bello is independent of 
jus ad bellum.”16   
 
The permissibility of defensive force rests on one’s right against attack.  Where no such right 
exists, we cannot otherwise justify force simply because it is defensive.  In most cases of violent 
altercations, personal and national, one party’s violent action is a permissible use of force to 
defend their rights, whereas, the other party’s violent action is the act whereby they lose this 
right.  This creates a moral “asymmetry” between the attacker and defender–the criminal and the 
guiltless.  The moral difference between an attacker and defender undermines the symmetry 
thesis.  It also undermines the independence thesis because the method of the unjust attack 
cannot overcome the moral character of the act.  An UJC can no more justify his actions by 
citing their conformity to the principles of jus in bello than a mugger can justify his actions by 
citing the fact that he only attacked me and not my wife and children.  However, such a 
“justification” McMahan contends, is exactly what Walzer and Just War Theory make on the 
behalf of UJCs.   
 Walzer recognizes that criminals have no right to defensive force.  On this McMahan 
pushes with the following question: why is there a difference between the criminal and the UJC?  
Walzer’s response to this is that warfare and war are different from criminal activity because of 
the “necessity” involved.  Here again is Walzer’s instrumental argument that most combatants, 
just and unjust, are subjected to any number of forces–social, political, economic, and patriotic–
sufficient enough to constrain their will so that participation in a war is not “their crime.”  
McMahan’s response to Walzer’s argument is two fold.  First, he argues that it is not at all a 
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settled question that all combatants are sufficiently restrained in their ability to act.  This again 
would lead us to the conclusion that combatants can be both just and unjust.  Walzer might not 
argue against this conclusion.  However, it is the way in which we determine the combatants’ 
status that is in conflict with Walzer’s position.  Those combatants whose will is sufficiently 
restrained–conscripts and the like–are just, but those whose will is not constrained–volunteers, 
officers–are unjust.  This is not the manner in which Walzer would separate the just and the 
unjust.  So long as a sufficiently responsible combatant executes an unjust war “strictly within 
the rules,” Walzer would hold him as a JC.  It is only those who fail to comply with jus in bello 
standards that Walzer holds as unjust.  A different sort of distinction is at issue here.  Some 
combatants, based on their caste and set, would meet the justifying criteria while some might not. 
Thus, we are lead to accept some combatants as just and others as not, based on their relative 
moral responsibility and not on their compliance with the standards of jus in bello.  This 
conclusion works to undermine the symmetry thesis because it holds that compliance with jus in 
bello is the basis for wartime rights.   
McMahan’s second response is that coercion, duress, ignorance and any such extenuating 
circumstances are never thought to justify wrongful action but only to excuse.  As McMahan 
states: 
the various considerations that Walzer cites are at best excuses. They may show 
that a particular unjust combatant is not a criminal and is not to be blamed or 
punished for what he does, but they do not show that he acts permissibly.17 
    
We still need a way to distinguish the permissible from impermissible, and Walzer’s 
instrumental argument fails to provide any basis for holding that some UJCs act permissibly, as 
opposed to only excusably.  That failure undermines the symmetry thesis.   
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The Parallel Argument 
 McMahan’s “parallel” argument argues against the independence thesis and the 
symmetry thesis from the considerations of just cause and its implications for defensive force.  
McMahan begins by claiming a moral priority for just cause as a consideration of jus ad bellum.  
This is so because if there is a lack of a just cause, then most other requirements of jus ad bellum 
“cannot be satisfied even in principle.”18 McMahan states that a just cause is a “restriction on the 
type of aim or end that may legitimately be pursued by the means of war.”19 It is a distinction of 
principle and not, except in extreme circumstances, of scale.  It is for this reason that McMahan 
claims its primacy.  Recall that the general consensus is that the guiding principles of jus ad 
bellum are:  just cause, competent authority, right intention, reasonable hope of success, 
necessity, and proportionality.  McMahan narrows the list by claiming that reasonable hope of 
success is “subsumed by the proportionality requirement,”20 rejecting competent authority as a 
consideration of jus ad bellum, and holding the remaining requirements to be necessary 
conditions to justify the resort to war.  However, McMahan further argues that just cause plays a 
critical role in the satisfaction of these remaining requirements.  To satisfy right intention we 
must wage a war for the express purpose of achieving a just cause.  That is, the end that can 
justify our resort to war must be our goal and not a morally contrived smoke screen for some 
other purpose.  The principle of necessity dictates that our resort to war is the last option 
available to achieve a just cause.  That war is necessary for the achievement of some other–less 
than just–cause or good holds no “justificatory force.”21  Finally, “proportionality” holds that the 
ends pursued by war must be proportionate in value to the goods or ends lost.  For McMahan, 
those goods that can count in this calculation are only those that are constitutive of, or 
instrumental to, the just cause.  To hold otherwise implies the incoherent view that “war is 
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justified, at least in part, by the fact that it would achieve certain goods that cannot permissibly 
be achieved by the means of war.”22 I take McMahan’s claim for the primacy of “just cause” in 
the considerations of jus ad bellum to be essentially correct. 
Returning to the “parallel” argument, McMahan highlights the dependence of 
proportionality calculations on the presence of a just cause.  This requirement of jus ad bellum 
proportionality appears to have a parallel requirement in jus in bello proportionality.  Simply put, 
jus in bello proportionality requires that the goods achieved by any act in war must outweigh the 
bad effects.  For McMahan only those goods that can count in the jus ad bellum calculation–
goods stipulated by or instrumental to the just cause–can count in the jus in bello calculation:  
For if other goods cannot contribute to the justification for war, they cannot figure 
in the justification for the individual acts of war that are together constitutive of 
the war.23 
 
This leads to the following two conclusions.  First, in the absence of a just cause–a criterion of 
jus ad bellum–no act of war can satisfy the requirements of jus in bello proportionality.  This is 
an obvious challenge to the independence thesis because jus in bello appears to supervene on jus 
ad bellum.  Second, if we take the requirements of jus in bello to be necessary requirements of 
permissible warfare, it follows that “no act of war by an unjust combatant can be permissible.”24  
This is an obvious challenge to the symmetry thesis because the UJC cannot, in principle, abide 
by jus in bello; therefore, the UJC cannot lay claim to jus in bello compliance to justify his acts. 
 An example may help to make the implications of the previous three arguments more 
clear.  The example will concern Private Sajer, an infantryman in the Wehrmacht and his status 
as either a JC or UJC based on fictional situations in a historically relevant context.  In 1941, the 
Wehrmacht25 launched Operation Barbarossa as a continuation of Hitler’s policy of aggression.  
Since any conquest of the Soviet Union would require the capture of Leningrad, the Germans 
41 
attack to capture this city.  In planning for the city’s investment, the Wehrmacht identifies a large 
Red Army barracks as a key subordinate objective.  Sajer’s battalion is assigned to the task and 
his company takes as its mission the capture of a further subordinate objective–an apartment 
complex over-watching the barracks.  Sajer is a competent soldier and plays an important role in 
the capture of his company’s objective.  During the attack Sajer has done nothing to violate the 
traditional tenets of jus in bello, but his actions have killed a few noncombatants and many Red 
Army combatants.   
 McMahan’s “parallel” argument would claim that Private Sajer cannot, in principle, meet 
with the jus in bello requirement of proportionality because the objective of seizing the 
apartment complex is not the type of good that can off set the deaths the action caused.  This is 
because the apartment complex is a subordinate goal that supports the larger, unjust Operation 
Barbarossa.  If we hold that Sajer has failed to meet the proportionality requirements of jus in 
bello, then he is an UJC.  However, the fact that he failed to meet the requirements of jus in bello 
did not depend on the actions he took, but the end those actions supported.  We have no reason to 
think that Sajer has fought outside the rules of Just War Theory, only that the cause that required 
his action on that day was unjust.  Therefore, we have strong reasons to believe that jus in bello 
cannot be held independent of jus ad bellum.  Rather, for one to hold the rights of jus in bello 
requires the prior satisfaction of the requirements of jus ad bellum. 
 McMahan’s “asymmetry” argument would claim, contrary to the symmetry thesis, that 
Sajer had no right to attack the building or return fire, while the Red Army soldiers he faced did 
hold such a right.  This is because Sajer’s participation in Operation Barbarossa, through the 
attack on the apartment complex, is the act by which he forfeits his presumptive right not to be 
attacked.  The Red Army soldiers, on the other hand, act in accordance with a justifiable right to 
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defend themselves and others.  In this situation the combatants, Sajer and the Red Army, are not 
moral equals, and this undermines the symmetry thesis.  Moreover, McMahan would claim, 
based on the “asymmetry” argument, that Sajer’s example undermines the independence thesis 
because Sajer’s acts that are in adherence with jus in bello requirements do not justify him, they 
indict him. 
 A slight change in Private Sajer’s condition will help to bring the conclusions of the 
“surprise attack” argument into focus as well.  In this situation Sajer is now stationed in 1944 
Germany.  His unit has generally abandoned all actions expect those required to defend the local 
populace from a now murderous campaign of retribution and conquest by the Red Army.  In a 
local battle, Sajer leads an attack to capture a building required to thwart a Red Army attack on a 
village.  Sajer’s actions have the same result, a few dead civilians and many dead Russians. 
In the light of the “surprise attack” and “parallel” arguments our judgment of Sajer’s 
actions are now, according to McMahan, quite different.  This was not because of any difference 
in Sajer’s actions.  They were, in both cases, roughly the same.  The moral distinction we make 
between the two actions relates to the respective ends of the action, not the quality of the action.  
In the examples above our judgments about jus ad bellum came before and informed our 
judgments about jus in bello.  This conclusion runs counter to the independence thesis.  
Furthermore, we have no reason to think Sajer did not act with honor.  Indeed, we could cast him 
as a very chivalrous combatant taking pains and risks to limit the harm he inflicted and it does 
not change the basic reaction that he and his adversaries are morally asymmetric in each case.  
This conclusion contradicts the symmetry thesis. 
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The Implacable Pursuer 
 McMahan’s “Implacable Pursuer” argument reasons from the norms of defensive force 
and aims to cast doubt on the strict immunity of noncombatants.  It does this by challenging the 
grounds upon which Just War Theory makes the traditional distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant.  The thought experiment at the center of the argument has three principle 
characters:  the “Implacable Pursuer” who is wholly controlled by the “Initiator” and bent on the 
killing of the “just defender.”26  The key element here is that the “Implacable Purser” is a 
“Nonresponsible Threat.”27  That is, she figures prominently in the causal structure of the threat 
posed to the “just defender” but bears no moral responsibility for that threat.  This renders her 
“morally indistinguishable from an innocent bystander.”28  Therefore, it seems wrong to state 
that the “Implacable Pursuer” has made herself liable to attack simply by posing a threat.  
McMahan reinforces this conclusion by adjusting the conditions slightly.  In the second case, the 
“just defender” must choose between killing the “Implacable Pursuer” or, in the process of 
escaping, kill the “Initiator” who poses no current threat.  McMahan concludes that:  
Because the Initiator is the one who is morally responsible for the fact that 
someone must die, he should, as a matter of justice, bear the costs of his own 
voluntary and culpable action.29 
 
The conclusion is that what makes one liable to attack–the way in which one might forfeit the 
right against defensive force–is “responsibility for initiating or sustaining” an unjust threat.30  
McMahan calls this the “responsibility criterion.”31 
 Since the act of posing a threat was the basis for the distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant in Just War Theory, we can see that McMahan’s “responsibility criterion” would 
serve to undermine the strict immunity of noncombatants.  For, if we expand the “responsibility 
criterion” to applications in war what distinguishes legitimate targets from illegitimate targets is 
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not threat, but a “moral responsibility for an unjust threat … or, more generally, for a grievance 
that provides a just cause for war.”32  The most obvious consequence of this criterion is that 
“virtually all” UJCs will fall into the category of legitimate targets.  But there is an important 
caveat that McMahan draws out based on his “eccentric” view of responsibility that will serve to 
refine the determination between legitimate and illegitimate targets.  This is the distinction 
between culpability and responsibility.  McMahan is insistent that one may be responsible for an 
unjust threat, but hold varying degrees of culpability.  However, for now it is useful to note that 
McMahan’s conception is that moral responsibility is a question of scale and culpability is the 
relevant factor in determining one’s place on the scale.  All those who hold a moral 
responsibility–combatant or not–for an unjust threat or grievance are legitimate targets.  This is 
an unusual, if not also troubling, conclusion in the discussion of the ethics of war.  That it may 
be, even if only in principle, permissible to target civilians not currently contributing to the war 
effort, or posing a threat, is unorthodox. 
The Divergence of War’s Morality   
McMahan’s four arguments offer a compelling critique of the three jus in bello tenets of 
Just War Theory.  His “deep morality of war” runs at odds with virtually every important aspect 
of current Just War Theory and the international humanitarian law that is its corollary.  The 
independence thesis appears false because in the first three arguments the judgment between JC 
and UJC turned on jus ad bellum considerations and not satisfaction of jus in bello requirements.  
This would lead us to a conception of war’s morality that is not bifurcated but linked.  The 
requirements of jus ad bellum are not distinct from jus in bello.  Rather, jus ad bellum 
requirements travel far in determining the jus in bello norms that are applicable to combatants 
and noncombatants.  The symmetry thesis appears false because in the first three arguments we 
45 
found reasons to make relevant moral distinctions within the traditional class of combatants.  
This would lead us to the need for a principled way to make such distinctions, and, given the loss 
of the independence thesis, to suspect such distinctions come by way of our jus ad bellum 
considerations.  The immunity thesis appears false as well because the “Implacable Pursuer” 
argument has given us reasons to think that posing an active threat is not the only consideration 
relevant to determining one’s liability to attack.  The process by which noncombatants may be 
viable targets in this respect has now become an open question. 
 McMahan’s dissenting conclusions have come in for some sharp criticism from Walzer, 
Rodin, and Henry Shue.  The fundamental issue is the degree to which war’s morality ought to 
be divergent from the morality of normal human relations.  McMahan is committed, almost 
stridently, to the idea that war and its relations can reduce to the ideas of individual morality–that 
is, there is no significant divergence.  His critics hold that the moral reality of war is either 
irreducible to individual rights of self-defense–Rodin–or, that it is completely distinct from the 
norms of everyday human affairs–Walzer and Shue.     
David Rodin is specifically critical of McMahan’s account of noncombatant liability.  His 
criticism turns on the fact that if we alter the conditions of the “Implacable Pursuer” only slightly 
to accord more readily with moral agency of soldiers, our intuitions “align very differently.”33  
Rodin charges, and McMahan admits, that combatants rarely, if ever, lack moral agency as 
completely as the “Implacable Pursuer.”  So Rodin offers a case more in line with the traditional 
combatant.  In this case the principal actors are a “provocateur” and a “pursuer” duped or 
enraged into attacking the defender.  In this example Rodin claims that “we would favor killing 
the pursuer who is currently posing a threat”34 over the person who may bear more responsibility 
for the threat.  For Rodin, this is so because “a minimally responsible agent intervenes with an 
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action more proximate to the unjust threat.”35  Rodin’s objection is essentially that McMahan’s 
account of liability is insufficiently complex to capture all the relevant norms in the collective 
action of war.  It seems clear from McMahan’s argument that noncombatants can bear 
responsibility for unjust attacks or unjust wars, but altering the arguments even slightly towards 
an account more in line with collective action appears to render the noncombatant immune to 
lethal force. 
 Rodin then doubts the “Implacable Pursuer” argument.  As it turns out, the charge that 
McMahan’s account of liability is too individualistic may be a powerful critique of McMahan’s 
project.  Both the “surprise attack” and “asymmetry” arguments depend on McMahan’s use of 
individual self-defense to carry.  If war and warfare occupy a moral realm so divergent from 
normal life that analogies from personal or interpersonal morality cannot carry any force, then 
McMahan’s project may be fundamentally misguided.  Such a divergence is at the heart of 
Walzer’s position when he states that war “has no equivalent in a settled society.”36 Walzer 
writes:  
What Jeff McMahan means to provide … is a careful and precise account of 
individual responsibility in time of war. What he actually provides, I think, is a 
careful and precise account of what individual responsibility in war would be like 
if war were a peacetime activity.37   
 
Henry Shue in “Do We Need a ‘Morality of War’ ” makes the point even more forcefully: 
At bottom, McMahan is arguing by analogy from ordinary situations to situations 
in war that are crucially disanalogous; the assumption that the two cases, ordinary 
life and war, are analogous begs the question against the laws of war.38    
 
Both Walzer and Shue support this claim with an account of the nature of combat that is 
sympathetic to combatant’s predicament.  That is, that McMahan’s position is unfairly 
burdensome to those fighting because of his insistence on discerning moral liability as the 
necessary criterion for application of force.  As Shue states, the objection is a “matter of ought 
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presupposes can.”39  Walzer echoes this when he states that McMahan’s account of liability isn’t 
“going to make a difference on the battlefield–because of what battlefields are like.”40  For both 
Shue and Walzer, war is simply a tragedy that must have a morality significantly different from 
normal life because of the extreme circumstances.  If the moral reality of war is divergent from 
normal life, then it would constitute a decisive objection to McMahan’s deeper morality.  
However, the case is not as decisive as Walzer and Shue make it to be. 
 There are two things to say to the objection based on war’s moral reality.  One Shue 
recognizes, and one he and Walzer may not.  The first comment is a theoretical point: the 
argument about the moral reality of war only carries against McMahan’s conception of liability, 
which he derives from reflecting on individual morality.  Were we to sufficiently flesh out a 
concept of moral liability that we could index to war fairly, the objection would seem to fall 
away.  That is, if we could develop a conceptual framework for the assessment of member 
liability for group actions, we might come closer to the mark of an account of liability that is fair 
to use in war.   McMahan is committed to the assumption that morality in war is directly drawn 
from or reducible to individual morality.  With Walzer, Shue, and Rodin, I find this aspect of 
McMahan’s view problematic.  War is essentially a group activity.  For this reason, events and 
arguments that draw on the normative relationship between only a few individuals like a mugger 
and a stroller are only very roughly analogous to normative relations in war.  The norms of war, 
however, do not reduce to these less complicated relations.  As Shue makes clear the UJC is the 
“nearest–but not very near–analogue to the mugger” while the JC is the “nearest–but not very 
near–analogue to the stroller.”41  For this reason, McMahan’s “surprise attack,” “asymmetry,” 
and “Implacable Pursuer” arguments are initially compelling, but stand in need of a substantial 
account of individual responsibility within the context of group, or collective, activity.  However, 
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the “parallel” argument appears to retain its force.  The strength of this argument was the moral 
priority of just cause, and not an account of liability.  So as it stands now, the independence 
thesis seems dubious based on McMahan’s arguments.  However, the viability of the symmetry 
and immunity theses of Just War Theory will stand or fall based on an account of liability that is 
in line with the moral reality of war.   
 The second point is the following:  The objection of Walzer and Shue is essentially that a 
soldier’s lot is already rough, and that placing further constraints beyond the mere determination 
of threat borders on being morally intolerable.  But, Walzer and Shue simply overstate the 
relevant facts about the experience of war.  While it is clear that combat, or more specifically, 
direct fire contact, is not the time or the place to be determining whose bullets are morally liable 
and morally justified, combat is not the sum total of a combatant’s experience. War, as an 
experience, consists of long periods of boredom and drudgery punctuated by moments of 
excitement that can become painfully, inhumanely, terrifying.  To judge the possibility of what 
we can or ought to do in war from the perspective of these moments of “punctuated terror” is 
mistaken, or at least only half right.   
Walzer and Shue describe the state of a combatant in terms that emphasize the 
uncertainty of combat, and the pervasive presence of threats, and the tyranny that war places on 
one’s humanity.  However, this description is more characteristic of what it is like to be losing a 
fight in a war and there is more to being a combatant than simply fighting.  Uncertainty and the 
“friction of war”42 are clearly elements of the battlefield.  However, they are elements that 
soldiers must train to handle and plan to overcome simply to win.  It is not beyond the pale to 
think that they could add some measure of moral reasoning and reflection on liability to their 
planning before during and after direct fire contact.  An exhaustive account of the nature of war’s 
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reality and any way that may bear on what we can consider war’s moral reality is beyond the 
scope of my work.  I want only to point to the fact what combatants ought to do in war may not 
meet with McMahan’s requirements, but the moral reality of war may come quite a bit closer to 
normal life than Shue or Walzer realize.  How close it comes will determine the extent to which 
McMahan’s arguments apply to the jus in bello theses of Just War Theory. 
 Jeff McMahan’s “deep morality” of war comes by way of his application of the norms of 
individual self-defense to the realities of war.  His four arguments provide reasons to take the 
traditional jus in bello tenets of Just War Theory as inconsistent and in conflict with the norms of 
self-defense.  The impendence thesis is a lost cause.  Based on McMahan’s arguments there 
seems little hope of holding to the “logical independence” of jus in bello and jus ad bellum.  The 
viability of the remaining theses in the face of McMahan’s arguments, however, depends on the 
applicability of an analogy from individual self-defense to the reality of war.  This is related to 
the results of Chapter II.  If we can find an adequate ground for the right to national-defense, 
then it should offer a view of the norms that govern warfare.  In this light we can determine the 
success or failure of McMahan’s arguments.  This is my aim for Chapter IV: an end worthy of 
defense and the limits it implies for the use of military force in its defense. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
 
NORMATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MORAL REALITY OF WAR 
The arguments of Rodin and McMahan have left Just War Theory on shaky ground.  The 
permissibility of defensive force, either between states or on the battlefield between soldiers, is 
one of the guiding norms of Just War Theory.  However, Rodin’s arguments against the right of 
national-defense have shown that there is no normative relationship between self-defense and 
national-defense.  This is because Just War Theory cannot offer a normative end capable of 
grounding national-defense.  McMahan’s arguments have shown that there is reason to believe 
that the Just War tenets of jus in bello are inconsistent with the permissibility of defensive force.  
The independence thesis seems flatly false, but the viability of the remaining theses depends only 
on the extent to which the moral reality of war diverges from the moral reality of everyday life.  
The loss of the independence thesis brings us to the point where the moral questions of jus in 
bello and jus ad bellum appear linked.  So, if we were to find a normative end robust enough for 
national-defense, we can expect that end to go far in determining the moral reality of war and the 
light it can shed on McMahan’s remaining arguments. 
In A Liberal Theory of International Justice, Andrew Altman and Christopher Wellman 
offer a normative conception of a state’s right to political self-determination that may provide the 
end national-defense requires.  That is, it will offer a right based on a normative conception of 
sovereignty (hereafter AWS) that can give national-defense a normative foundation sufficient to 
govern its practice.  The generation of these normative limits on national-defense will help 
determine the moral reality of war and the extent to which McMahan’s arguments stand or fall in 
this light.   My following argument has two main aims:  First, I will see how AWS meets 
Rodin’s challenges to national-defense.  For this, I will reverse his method of argument by 
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showing that AWS is a normative end that is unobjectionable from Rodin’s position.  I will then 
demonstrate how AWS can generate the normative limits Rodin requires.  These are 
requirements of jus ad bellum that limit military action.  That is, to meet Rodin’s requirements, 
we need to show limits that apply only the resort to war and when war should cease.  However, 
this will lead to the second aim of my argument–the moral reality of war in the light of AWS.  
My contention will be that the right of political self-determination can ground national-defense.  
However, this normative foundation will support McMahan’s call for significant revision of the 
current tenets of jus in bello.  Specifically, AWS further undermines the independence thesis, 
weakens the symmetry thesis and leaves the immunity of noncombatants as an open question.    
Normative Sovereignty 
 Altman and Wellman (hereafter A/W) offer a normative view of sovereignty as a group 
right to political self-determination based the moral value of individuals within and outside of the 
group.  What is of key importance is that AWS is a normative account.  It offers both reasons to 
respect the right of a group and criteria that show how and when that group may lose its right to 
political self-determination.  Simply put, AWS is a moral right of a properly legitimate political 
group to determine its own political affairs and it has a deontological basis in the individual 
value of its constituents.    
 A/W establish the claim for a right to political self-determination by examining the 
decolonization movement of the twentieth century.  By looking to this history, we can see that 
decolonization was “an effort to vindicate the collective moral right of political self-
determination.”1  This right is subject to two principles: 
1) A state has a moral right of political self-determination if and only if it 
adequately protects and respects human rights. 
54 
2) A nonstate group that aspires to become a state has a moral right to political 
self-determination if and only if it is willing and able to become a state that 
adequately protects and respects human rights.2 
 
These principles form the normative force behind AWS because they predicate a right to 
sovereignty or political self-determination on the protection of human rights.  These principles 
have three important consequences. 
The first important consequence of AWS is a distinction between political and non-
political groups.  The groups subject to the two principles and thereby potential rights holders are 
political groups. This distinction has as two important consequences.  First, it works as a limiting 
criterion.  The groups to which this right applies must be political and nothing else.  Second, it 
also offers a sufficiently broad enabling criterion.  That is, the right is a generic political right 
that is consistent with a range of political systems; we will not be in a position of arbitrarily 
touting one political system’s deontological status over another.  For A/W, even a non-
democratic system can have a right of political self-determination, as long as it adequately 
respects and protects human rights.3 
 The second important consequence of AWS is what I will call the legitimacy threshold.  
Only those groups that can meet this threshold are able to claim the right of political self-
determination.  Here I must mark out what A/W consider a legitimate state.  It is one that 
“adequately protects its constituents’ human rights and respects the human rights of all others.”4  
A/W characterize this as the “requisite political functions”5 of the legitimate state.  Along with 
the connection of legitimacy to human rights, there are several other characteristics that are 
important to note here.  First, since AWS intends to confer the right of political self-
determination on those states that have “political legitimacy” there is a constitutive requirement 
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to “rule a territory.”6  That is, to count as legitimate any group in question must be able to offer 
some politically organized territory to its members.   
The character that any political organization must take to count as legitimate is also given 
by the “requisite political functions”.  That is, the group claiming political legitimacy not only 
protects the rights of its constituency; it must also respect the “human rights of all others”.  Here 
it is important to note that the key distinction is between protection and respect, and not members 
and non-members.  Politically legitimate groups do have a different normative relationship to 
members and non-members.  To its constituency it owes a duty of care and protection for their 
rights.  To all others that fall outside the class of a state’s political constituency it owes a duty to 
not impinge upon their rights.  There may well be territorial inhabitants who are not members of 
the group.  Their participation in the group’s political action, however, is not a prerequisite for 
the group’s obligation to respect their rights.  These last two requirements are limiting criteria: 
they serve as a way to limit the actions that the group may take to protect its right to self-
determination from internal challenges and external interference. 
 The final consequence of AWS is that it is a group right with deontological value.  For 
A/W the deontological claim to political self-determination stems from a proper view of the 
rights of the individuals in the group.  In this A/W are trying to reconcile “value-individualism” 
with their claim to a state’s right to self-determination.  It is key to note here that A/W are not 
looking to establish a state right based on an analogy between the state and the individual.  
Rather, they will develop a right to political self-determination based only on the achievement of 
the group’s members in collective activity. The requirement to respect individual rights grounds 
the requirement to respect the group’s right. A/W say as much in the following:  
When an individual’s right to autonomy is violated, the individual herself is 
wronged.  In contrast, when a state’s right of self-determination is violated, it is 
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the individuals qua members of the political group–rather than the group itself–
who are wronged.7 
 
A/W recognize rightly that the rights of the group are owed to its members by virtue of their 
status as a member of the group.  As they state further, “people are owed … respect because of 
their special roles, standing, or abilities.”8  There is no reason to think that political groups could 
not enjoy similar enhanced moral standing based on their effective protection of human rights.   
We must be careful here as well to mark out what A/W are not claiming.  The right that 
the group holds is consistent with “value-individualism” but it is not simply a reduction to 
individual rights, nor is it the result of a bundling of many rights of the individual.  Rather, A/W 
are trying to capture the process by which a group gains rights that individuals could not have on 
their own.  In this sense, it seems clear that it could not be just a reduction or amalgamation of 
rights that confers the right to political self-determination:     
the group is entitled to dominion over its self-regarding affairs only because it has 
achieved a certain status, a status achieved by the collective efforts of the 
individual group members.  Put plainly … a group of citizens who are able and 
willing to perform the requisite political functions have a right to political self-
determination.9 
 
It is the group effort, the individual’s role therein and, importantly, the results (or at least the 
potential results) of the effort that bestow a right to the group as such.  The right stems from the 
collective activity of the group; but its violation is a wrong against the members of the group as 
individuals.  
 There is one more point to cover that is important given my current project.  If groups 
have rights based on the application of the AWS legitimacy threshold and this threshold is 
connected to the protection and respect of human rights, then we must get hold of some notion of 
what counts as a human right and what does not.  Here A/W are helpful.  They see human rights 
as individual “moral rights to the protections … against the standard and direct threats to leading 
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a minimally decent human life.”10  The important concept here is “standard and direct threats.”  
Threats that satisfy the conditions of “standard and direct” will have a corollary protection that 
will constitute a human right.  The conditions of being a “standard” threat are straightforward.  
Some exemplars of such threats are: torture, persecution (political, racial, etc.), and arbitrary 
imprisonment.  A/W explain the conditions making a threat a “direct” threat by contrasting them 
with indirect threats.  Taking arbitrary imprisonment for example, it is a “direct” threat to a 
“minimally decent life” because it–in and of itself–makes such a life impossible or unlikely.  In 
contrast, one’s ability to afford a lawyer would be an indirect threat to a “minimally decent life” 
because one is thereby at a greater hazard to suffer the “direct” threat of arbitrary imprisonment.  
Therefore, threats that in and of themselves make a decent human life impossible or unlikely are 
“direct;” whereas threats that make such life unlikely through the mediation of some other 
factors are instrumental.  The existence of the right depends on the nature of the threat.  For 
A/W, where there is a direct threat, there is a corresponding human right to protection.  Where 
there is an instrumental threat, there is only a corresponding “human-rights based claim”11 for 
amelioration.      
AWS is a normative account of state sovereignty.  The conception is robust and has three 
defining characteristics.  First, it is a generic political right.  That is, it only applies to political 
groups, but does not demand what form those groups take.  Second, it is subject to the legitimacy 
threshold.  The right only exists for those political groups that protect and respect human rights.  
Finally, it is a right held by groups (properly functioning) and grounded in the moral value of the 
constituents. 
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Constructing a Right to National-defense 
 To see how AWS can meet the challenges of Rodin, it will be useful to reverse his 
method of argument.  That is, I will start by showing that the right to political self-determination 
entailed by AWS is the end that can ground national-defense in a way that is unobjectionable on 
the basis of Rodin’s concerns.  After this, I will argue that political self-determination can 
impose normative limits on the operation of national-defense.  What should come to light is a 
right to national-defense that is normatively analogous to the right of self-defense.  This will 
meet the first basic aim of my argument by salvaging national-defense as the collective right of a 
group to protect its own political self-determination.  To do this I need to show that AWS 
provides a normative foundation to national-defense that meets Rodin’s requirements.  These 
are: the end is normative and not simply factual; it is objective, i.e., cross-culturally valid; and it 
is particular in that it demarcates to whom or what the right accrues.  
AWS is a normative conception of sovereignty that rests the right to political self-
determination on a group’s ability to protect and respect human rights.  Recall the charge from 
Rodin against holding sovereignty as the normative foundation of national-defense.  He claimed 
that it is an “empty vessel” that cannot do the moral work required because it is a “factual and 
not a normative concept.”12  Moreover, the concepts behind sovereignty did little more than 
serve as legal justification for “power protecting itself.”13  It should be clear at this point how 
AWS has filled this vessel with moral content.  What is of interest in AWS is not the protection 
of power, but the use of power to protect people.  Its foundation is the moral worth of the 
individual.  This is consistent with Rodin’s requirements for normativity that he takes from 
Joseph Raz’s “humanistic principle”.  This Raz defines as:  
59 
the claim that the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness of 
anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to human life 
and its quality.14 
    
We might correctly describe AWS as an application of Raz’s principle to the traditional concepts 
of sovereignty.  The result is a normative foundation in the deontological right of groups to 
political self-determination through the group’s protection and respect for individual rights.  This 
is an end that AWS entails.  
Two of Rodin’s concerns–that the right to national-defense ought to be objective and 
particular–are conceptually related.  In the first case we are looking for an end that is 
“objectively” valid and must meet two requirements–it must be a generic political right and must 
not admit to the tacit endorsement of force.  A/W hold the same view; AWS implies a generic 
political right.  It does not make claims in favor of any form of government or culture, only its 
effects.  Moreover, only those forms of government that fail to respect and protect human rights 
receive censure.  This relieves our initial worries that we might be in “the embarrassing situation 
of excluding non-democratic regimes”15 from holding a right to national-defense.  However, 
Rodin’s deeper criticism of Walzer’s retreat from a political view of self-determination does not 
clear so easily.   
Rodin is concerned that Walzer’s position allows force and coercion to act as grounds of 
self-determination.  A/W’s position is free of this concern because it grounds the collective right 
to political self-determination in the protection of human rights.  A group may choose “any 
institutional arrangements–democratic or otherwise–that adequately respects and protects human 
rights.”16  So long as the founding movements of any particular regime respect the rights of its 
members and others, AWS makes no claims to shape its institutions.  The point here is that AWS 
places theoretical limits on how a group may “brave labor and danger” in their pursuit of 
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political autonomy.   These limits allow us to retain a generic political right that is “objective” 
but not committed, tacitly or otherwise, to an endorsement of force or coercion as the legitimate 
grounds of the right to self-determination.  This is not to say that AWS would not apply to 
current government regimes that developed out of a morally suspect past.  But neither would it 
endorse such regimes until they could meet the “legitimacy” threshold.  Moreover, it seems that 
AWS would require such regimes to take adequate steps to redress any remaining significant 
human rights grievance attending its formation and consolidation of political power.   
The way in which AWS obtains objectivity sets the groundwork for its satisfaction of 
Rodin’s call for particularity.  In this criterion we are after requirements that demarcate to whom 
or what the right of political self-determination accrues.  There are two problems here.  The first 
is that we face what Rodin calls the “Russian doll effect” of groups within human society.17  That 
is, individuals are members of any number of communal and social groups.  Why is it that the 
right to political self-determination adheres to political groups and not to these other groups?  
The second related problem is how are we to go about determining individual communities?  Our 
second question is a bit easier for A/W to answer–only political communities count, therefore, 
the boundaries are political.  Although the drawing of political boundaries is problematic, they 
may be simply the only way in which the protections of human rights can be secured in the 
modern world.  Any other criterion seems fraught with difficulty–in the case of familial, cultural, 
or national communities lines of demarcation might blur intolerably.  The theoretical ability of 
political association to cut across the many other options leads to the answer of our first question.  
Political associations, subject to the legitimacy threshold, possess defensive rights.  A legitimate 
state has the right to go to war to protect its right of political self-determination.  The situation is 
roughly analogous to the right of an individual to defend by force her right of autonomy.  But 
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note that not all states are analogous to individuals in this regard: only states that meet the 
legitimacy threshold are analogous because they have a right to political autonomy. 
Discussion of a few examples relevant to Rodin’s objections demonstrates how AWS 
applies to particular political communities.  These examples involve the resolution of conflicts 
between legitimate states and the status of an illegitimate state’s defensive rights.  AWS can 
allow for the possibility of war between two legitimate states without making one necessarily 
illegitimate.  The legitimacy threshold would travel far in preventing any sort of political conflict 
between currently legitimate states escalating to force of arms.  However, should such action 
come about, one can conceive of a limited war between two legitimate states that would not 
threaten either states’ legitimacy.  As examples I would offer conflicts like the Falklands War–
with qualifications–or perhaps a military conflict over rights to ocean resources.   
However, here Rodin might charge that there is a deeper point in this example.  Although 
it is important to see how AWS can allow two states to clash and not, by that fact, become 
illegitimate, more important to Rodin is a description of an end that would make it “wrong for 
one liberal democratic state to conquer and rule another.”18  Here again AWS can meet the 
criterion.  For, the right to political self-determination articulated in AWS is a deontological 
right, not an instrumental measure.  If State X meets the threshold, it is legitimate and thereby its 
constituency has a right to political self-determination.  That State Y operates further above the 
threshold, or could offer a qualitatively better life to those in State X does not void the right of 
State X to determine and order its own affairs.  Rather, those in State Y have a duty to respect 
and not violate the rights held by the members of X.  
As to illegitimate states, AWS has a simple answer–they have no right to political self-
determination, therefore they have no right to defend it.  That is not to say that there are no 
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considerations of right and justice applicable to individual citizens of such states.  The AWS 
legitimacy threshold that denies the rights of illegitimate states similarly constrains the actions of 
legitimate states.  The requirement to “respect the rights of all others”19 implies that a state’s lack 
of defensive rights is not a simple litmus test for the application of military force.  It is a 
necessary, but not on its own sufficient condition to justify force.  In a relevant discussion of the 
status of illegitimate states, A/W offer the following statement of an illegitimate state’s rights:   
the lack of a moral right to political self-determination does not mean that a group 
should not have its own politically independent state; it does mean that the 
group’s case for political independence is much more vulnerable to empirical 
contingencies.20 
 
The best context for this discussion is the current debate about the permissibility of Armed 
Humanitarian Intervention.   A/W discuss this at length and offer a “two-pronged account”21 of 
when it is permissible to violate the political integrity of an illegitimate state.  The first prong in 
this case is the legitimacy threshold.  That is, we must first decide if the state in question is 
legitimate or not.  If the state is not legitimate we move to the second prong, which is a 
proportionality requirement.  To satisfy this prong the armed intervention must meet all the 
normal requirements of jus ad bellum proportionality.  In short, the A/W account licenses cross-
border force against illegitimate states in order to protect individuals in those states from human 
rights abuses. 
AWS looks to meet all of Rodin’s requirements for a normative end worthy of national-
defense.  It is normative, objective and particular.  It offers a value that is widely valued and 
clearly establishes to whom it applies.  It accounts for the defensive rights of legitimate states 
and for a lack of defensive rights of illegitimate regimes based on normative and not de facto 
sovereignty.  However, there is still one more task to go–how can AWS serve to limit resorts to 
force?  The key concept to understanding the limits AWS imposes is that the right it implies is 
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not inalienable or inherent; it is earned, and can be lost.  Explaining how a group might forfeit 
the right to political self-determination will mark the normative limits of the force used to protect 
it and meet our second principle concern. 
Forfeiture of Political Autonomy and the Normative Limits of National-defense 
My exploration of the normative limits imposed on national-defense by the two principles 
of political self-determination will have one guiding idea: a group’s conduct can forfeit the 
collective right to political self-determination.  In particular, group actions that fail to protect the 
rights of its constituency and respect the rights of non-members undermine the group’s claims to 
political self-determination.   The framework of necessity, imminence, and proportionality is 
useful in setting the limits to national-defense within AWS.  It will also serve to strengthen the 
normative ties between national-defense and self-defense; I will discuss each in turn.   
In so far as necessity acts as an enabling criterion, there is no change between the 
traditional limits of force and the limits set by AWS: military force must be the last option.  
However, the deeper concern is how AWS might guide our understanding of when we should 
cease military force.  Here necessity requires that we take only those measures required to restore 
the right in question.  Any further action, like the killing of an unconscious assailant in self-
defense, is a transgression of a right we have a duty to respect.  This seems to give us a first 
approximation as to the normative limits on force in AWS.  We can act to defend our political 
autonomy from military aggression.  However, the action is allowable only insofar as it restores 
our autonomy.  Moreover, we are not similarly allowed to fight against the aggressor’s ability to 
commit future crimes.  This is so because such action is likely to involve the transgression of the 
rights of others; namely, the citizens of the offending states.  Put simply, AWS predicates a 
group’s claim to the right that justifies a military defense on that group’s political legitimacy.  A 
64 
violation of the rights of groups or individuals threatens that status and thereby the group’s claim 
on the right of political self-determination.          
The role of imminence in the defense of AWS is not quite as clear as necessity.  
However, imminence does seem clearer than its current contentious state.  AWS allows the 
defense of political self-determination.  This serves to limit those actions that we can rightly 
view as threats into two broad categories.  Primary threats are uses of force that directly limit or 
impinge upon a group’s political autonomy as such.  In this sort are the more traditional 
“conquer and rule” threats.  Secondary threats are uses of force that indirectly undermine a 
legitimate group’s autonomy by attacking those who fall under the group’s protection.  Terrorism 
is the exemplar of this category.  These two categories offer a framework for what would count 
as an imminent threat.  In the first category state A’s mere disposition to directly attack state B’s 
autonomy is not enough to justify B’s military action.  Rather, there must be a demonstration by 
A of a willingness and ability to act on such dispositions.  Similarly in the second category an act 
is only a threat if it is a clear that an attack is or will shortly offer harm.  This would seem to rule 
out preventive force and move the debate back to the idea of pre-emptive force.   
The normative foundation of AWS can finally help us articulate the scope of a 
proportional use of force in national defense.  We are looking for a concept that can tell us when 
the “harms inflicted” are “commensurate with the value of the goods and rights preserved.”22  
The connection of political sovereignty with the respect and protection of human rights is the 
concept that allows AWS to render sovereignty commensurate with evils of war.  The right of 
sovereignty is an earned human right that we can measure against other rights when considering 
the justice of a military action.  The baseline of AWS is not the action of the aggressor.  It does 
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not view the violation of right as a license to do the same.  Rather the baseline is the rights of the 
individuals concerned. 
The A/W conception of sovereignty appears to answer Rodin’s critique of Just War 
Theory and its paradigm of national-defense.  Rodin’s critique began with spelling out how the 
current understanding of national-defense does not set limits on force that are analogous with the 
normative limits of self-defense.  From this he drew out the underlying conceptual problems with 
the end founding the right to national-defense in Just War theory.  Taking the A/W position and 
reversing this argument we can see that AWS can carry the conceptual load of the analogical 
argument from self-defense to national-defense.  This is because it provides a normative 
foundation for the right of political self-determination. This foundation seems apposite to the 
other problems attending the Just War Theory: the provision of an objective good or end, a 
concept that can give us clear indications of who or what may hold a right to that good, and how 
that end may serve to adjudicate between legitimate and illegitimate states.  Moreover, the 
Altman/Wellman conception of sovereignty gives us clear limits to the steps we can take to 
protect the right. 
Inculpation, Exculpation, and Mediated Symmetry 
 It appears that the right to national-defense, as a right of legitimate political groups to 
defend their political self-determination with defensive force, can vindicate national-defense as a 
just cause for war.  So far, I have only examined the viability of this right in the light of jus ad 
bellum.  But, if we are to take seriously the dependence of jus in bello on ad bellum 
considerations, then the right to defend political self-determination should offer some light on the 
moral reality of war and the extent to which any fair statement of individual liability will support 
or undermine the remaining jus in bello theses of Just War Theory.  It is at this point that 
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Christopher Kutz can offer some help to the discussion.  Kutz’s conception of war as privileged 
sort of collective violence and what responsibility an individual in that collective could bear, 
combined with the Altman/Wellman conception of political legitimacy, can do the conceptual 
and normative work required to give us a wartime account of liability.   
Privileged Groups and Impunible Violence 
Kutz’s account of what counts for inculpation and exculpation in collective violence 
gives us a clear picture of the normative relationship between combatants, noncombatants, the 
just and the unjust.  His argument is fundamentally about normative relationships created by 
political sovereignty:  the relation between citizen and state, the relation between states in war, 
and the relationship between citizens of different states at war with one another.  The 
groundwork of the argument is the stipulation that war is one type of collective violence, and 
collective violence evokes in us two disparate moral responses.  Kutz calls these “themes of 
inculpation and exculpation.”23 These themes, according to Kutz, turn on our answer to why 
“certain forms of collective action privilege violence, while the other serves as the basis for 
punishing it.”24  For Kutz our moral reactions to collective criminal violence, either street crime 
or larger syndicate based crime, occur in the theme of inculpation.  That is, we do not privilege 
such violence and hold all members of the gang of thieves or international crime syndicate 
equally responsible and liable for any and all actions of the group.  The work-a-day Mafioso 
whose only job is to reliably run information from one location to another is as culpable in a 
murder as the hit man who uses the information to successfully kill his target.  Conversely, our 
moral reaction to collective political violence is much different.  Kutz contends that the political 
character of a collective “changes the normative valence” of the actions of its members “even to 
the point of rendering impunible what would otherwise be criminal.”25  The application of this is 
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clear enough.  So long as the group is sufficiently “political,” any individual contribution to the 
group’s action–even those actions resulting in death, destruction, and mayhem–is excused and 
not subject to punishment.  The key at this point is what counts as political a political group. 
 Kutz’s position is that a group is political if it involves “any forms of social action 
oriented around state or institutional formation, where power may … rest at the level of 
individual commitment to the shared project.”26 However, there is a problem.  So far, this 
conception of the political cannot justify why the realm of political violence should be a domain 
of impunity.  Here we can see the force of Rodin’s familiar charge above recast against Kutz’s 
arguments, namely, that “there must be something normatively rich about the domain of 
politics”27 that can tell us why political groups and their actions should enjoy exculpation.  Kutz 
does have three criteria for how we might classify a collective action as sufficiently political.  
These are: (1) “internal ordering”, (2) “the character of its aims”, and its (3) “degree of success 
on the ground.”28  There are two ways to read these criteria. Kutz intends the criteria to clarify 
when a violent act of a collective counts as political and not criminal violence.  But these criteria 
lead us very quickly back to the problem of why political violence is normatively different than 
criminal action.  As Rodin further points out, Kutz criteria relate in “some way to the standard ad 
bellum conditions for the justification of war.”29  What we need is an explanation of why 
political violence is exculpated, not an account of what violence is political. 
However, we can re-interpret Kutz’s criteria, with the help of AWS, and come up with a 
view of why political violence is exculpated.  If we take Kutz’s criteria to be not about how an 
act counts as a political act but how a political group counts as a legitimate political group, then 
things shake out much differently. Recall that what confers legitimacy, and thereby a right to 
political self-determination, in AWS, was that the group “adequately protects its constituents’ 
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human rights and respects the human rights of all others.”  Kutz’s three criteria look like 
necessary conditions to satisfying the legitimacy threshold of AWS.  That is, to perform the 
“requisite political functions” of legitimacy certainly a state must be able to:  Order its own 
internal affairs in a law-governed manner–(1) above.  It must have in the character of its 
institutions the goal of basic quality of life for its constituents and pursue this in a manner not 
offensive to the rights of others–(2) above.  Finally, it must actually succeed at, or be reasonably 
ready to succeed at attaining the first two criteria–(3) above.  If we take the criteria of Kutz to be 
related to AWS in this way, then the criteria not only help to classify which acts of collective 
violence are permissible because they are political, viz., acts of collective self-defense of a 
legitimate state.  They also establish which groups can rightfully undertake collective political 
violence in the first place. 
Individual Liability for Group Actions 
If we are to take war as essentially a conflict between political groups and these political 
groups can take up certain justified violent acts, then the political group is the normative space 
wherein we mediate things like responsibility, blame, and praise for collective violence.  As Kutz 
states, “the general combat privilege” to impunible acts of violence “is grounded in the relation 
of individual combatants to a collective decision to go to war.”30  That is, in assessing acts of 
violence or groups acting violently, we have a binary distinction.  On one side is individual 
exculpation; on the other is individual inculpation.   What throws the switch, so to speak, is the 
degree to which the group and act will count as sufficiently political vis-à-vis the group’s 
legitimacy.  If a group is a legitimate political group and its collective violence does not 
undermine this status, it will serve to exculpate its members.  If a group is not a legitimate 
political group or its collective violence is the act whereby it loses this status, then it will 
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inculpate its members.  The degree of liability in the latter case is a “matter of individual 
commitments to the collective.”31 
Collectives that are legitimate political groups and act according to Kutz’s criteria act 
permissibly and therefore create a “logical space”32 in which its individuals are exonerated for 
what would otherwise be impermissible.  Conversely, those collectives that lack legitimacy or 
whose violent actions undermine its legitimacy close this logical space to its members.  In this 
manner individuals in the latter group are inculpated and liable for the results of the act.  This 
gives us a tack on individual liability for the collective violence that constitutes war.  In the case 
of the legitimate group we grant a presumptive right to violence in defense of its political self-
determination.  We must then determine if the violent act is also sufficiently political so as not to 
forfeit the right.  In the case of the illegitimate group we assert that there is no presumptive right.  
Then we must look to the character of the act to see if it could redeem its constituent members.   
The Moral Reality of War and the Jus in Bello Tenets 
 Kutz’s account of group liability and AWS can now offer a normative framework in 
which to explore the viability of the three tenets of Just War Theory above.  In this framework, 
we seem to have three states of conflict that bear on the discussion: a conflict between two just 
groups, a conflict between a just group and an unjust group, and a conflict between two unjust 
groups.  Testing the three tenets in each of these cases we can explore the results of the position I 
have outlined above.  I will take each tenet in turn. 
 The first tenet, holding jus in bello to be independent of jus ad bellum, does not hold in 
any respect.  Indeed, the relationship is even more complicated than a simple hierarchical 
structure.  That is, jus in bello privileges do depend on jus ad bellum considerations, and these 
considerations are logically and morally prior.  However, the relationship is not one way.  The in 
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bello dependence on ad bellum seems clear enough considering our options above.  In so far as a 
group is a legitimate political group and its action is a legitimate instance of collective political 
violence, then its members enjoy the “combat privilege” of impunible violence.  Put another 
way, a group that has a right to political self-determination and acts to defend that right through 
defensive violence satisfies the requirements of jus ad bellum.  This satisfaction confers the 
rights and prohibitions of jus in bello on the group’s members.  When a group does not possess 
the right of political self-determination, there are no ad bellum rights and therefore no in bello 
privileges.  But this is only half the case.  There is, after the line of departure, an important way 
in which adherence to jus in bello requirements acts as a normative feedback loop on the status 
of a group or the character of its act.  The prosecution of a just war must fall within the 
normative limits of jus in bello or a group runs the risk of criminalizing the entire act or group.  
If the pursuit of a just goal takes a criminal tone and character in execution, then the group loses 
the right of political self-determination and thereby loses the right that grounded its just cause in 
the first place.  The effect is a heavily normative account, and, far from holding them to be 
independent, strengthens the relationship between jus in bello and jus ad bellum.   
 The symmetry thesis fares a bit better.  If we take the first type of conflict from above, 
the just versus the just,33 we can see a bit of logical space open for combatants on both sides to 
enjoy the same moral status.  In the case of two groups whose status as legitimate political 
groups gives them the presumptive right to political violence both antagonist states would enjoy 
in bello privileges.  This would remain the case so long as both sides operated within the 
restrictions of jus in bello, and both states retained jus ad bellum justification.  There is, however, 
still logical space for asymmetry.  Those who fight for illegitimate groups or fight for legitimate 
groups in a manner that might undermine legitimacy do not have the same moral status as those 
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who fight for legitimate groups in a way that is compatible with maintaining that legitimacy.  To 
put the point succinctly, one is exculpated–afforded the rights and under the restrictions of jus in 
bello–insofar as the group for which one is proxy is legitimate and the action one participates in 
is a legitimate act of political violence.  Conversely, one is inculpated–denied the rights and 
restrictions of jus in bello–insofar as one acts as proxy for an illegitimate group, or participates in 
an action that would render the group illegitimate.  The UJC would then not have a right to kill 
the JC.  This does not mean that she would hold no moral status at all.  Rather, her moral status 
would be similar to the moral status of a criminal.  The UJC is, in some manner, culpable for her 
actions; however, her treatment in the hands of her enemy is still subject to the requirement in 
AWS to respect human rights.  
 The final tenet, strict noncombatant immunity, may be best seen as an open question.  
While there seems to be logical space for the strict expression of the principle in the case of the 
just versus the just, there also seems to be room for noncombatant liability in the other cases.  In 
the first case, both sides are engaged in just causes.  So long as their activity and actions do 
nothing to threaten their legitimacy, the members of their group hold rights according to their 
role and participation in the collective activity of the group.  From this perspective, one might 
follow Kutz’s argument for a standard of combatant status depending on the bearing of arms.  
That is, those who bear arms openly while in the execution of the group’s activities are the only 
permissible targets of military force.   
 In the case of an illegitimate group the status of noncombatants appears a little muddier.  
There is a sense in which members of an illegitimate group beyond the traditional combatant 
bear responsibility and culpability for that group’s actions.  With that said, within this normative 
framework there is a heavy price to pay for rights violation.  Namely, the legitimacy of one’s 
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own political group depends on one’s treatment of non-members.  Moreover, it would seem that 
the quickest way to illegitimacy would be to visit war upon those whom you should not.  So we 
have two normative forces at work: culpability and the legitimacy threshold.  It appears that what 
will determine the case is the degree of culpability for the action or actions that render the group 
illegitimate or criminal.  What seems reasonable is a modified version of Rodin’s objection to 
McMahan’s arguments above.  That is, directed lethal military force should always and only be 
intentionally targeted at combatants.  Here, the combatant’s role as the proximate cause of any 
threat to life renders them the permissible targets of such force.  However, noncombatants in 
illegitimate groups hold no rights that can protect what I will call “ill-gotten goods” or protect 
them from the force required to dismantle the moral and causal impetus they bear to the group’s 
wrongful action.  Here some examples might be helpful.  The “ill-gotten goods” are those goods, 
services, and means that an illegitimate group gains through its criminal activity.  For example, 
the aristocracy of the antebellum southern United States enjoyed a wide range of goods–
property, riches, and social prestige–from chattel slavery.  While I think it is clear that those 
noncombatants retain their right to life, I can see no way that can justify their retention of such 
goods.  This seems especially so if the goods in question stand in some relation to the just cause 
for the war.  But there are many more questions at work here than I can introduce and answer.  
For now, the revision of the strict immunity of noncombatants seems at least a conceptual 
possibility, and therefore an open normative question.  
Conclusion 
 Just War Theory has enjoyed enormous philosophical and legal success.  This success has 
stemmed almost exclusively from the intuitive legitimacy given to Just War Theory by the norms 
of permissive defensive force.  Michael Walzer’s philosophical defense of the Just War Theory 
73 
rests on the assumption that states have a right to national-defense and that this is the paradigm 
case for a just war according to jus ad bellum.  Moreover, an equitable application of the norms 
of permissive defensive force to the moral reality of war is the center of his defense of the “war 
convention” and the tenets of jus in bello.  We have seen that the presumptive right of national-
defense needs a normative end; otherwise it cannot hold its normative relationship with self-
defense.  Also, we have seen that the loss of the independence thesis leaves us with a morality of 
war in need of a normative end as well.  The extent to which the remaining tenets of jus in bello 
are consistent with the norms of permissive defensive force depends on an account of individual 
liability for group actions consistent with an end that can justify war.  
The Altman/Wellman conception of the right to political self-determination is the 
normative end that can ground national-defense.  It is sufficiently normative, objective and 
particular; moreover, it can generate normative limits on the operation of national-defense.  
Taking an account of liability from Christopher Kutz and applying it to the right of political self-
determination we have seen that the jus in bello tenets of Just War Theory stand in need of 
revision.  The independence thesis remains straightforwardly untenable.  The symmetry thesis 
remains only as a strict conceptual possibility with dubious application.  Finally, the strict 
immunity of noncombatants, a bedrock of Just War Theory, stands as an open normative 
question.  
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1 Altman (2009), 13. 
2 Ibid., 13. 
3 Altman and Wellman, far from touting the deontological superiority of democracy or any other 
political form, argue specifically that democracy is not a human right. 
4 Ibid., 13. 
5 Ibid., 13. 
6 Ibid., 22. 
7 Ibid., 38. 
8 Ibid., 38. 
9 Ibid., 39. 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Ibid., 55. 
12 Rodin (2002) 119. 
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14 Raz, J. Quoted in Rodin (2002), 144. 
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16 Altman (2009), 26. 
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21 Ibid., 195. 
22 Rodin (2002), 115. 
23 Kutz (2005), 148. 
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26 Ibid., 156. 
27 Rodin (2008), 66. 
28 Kutz (2005), 176. 
29 Rodin (2008), 66 
30 Kutz (2005), 176. 
31 Ibid., 176. 
32 Ibid., 160. 
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33 This case may be only a conceptual possibility.  I offer no discussion of how this might obtain 
or an example in which it has arguably obtained in history. 
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